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Achieving transparency and security awareness in cloud environments is a challenging 
task. It is even more challenging in multi-cloud environments (where application compo-
nents are distributed across multiple clouds) owing to its complexity. This complexity 
open doors to the introduction of threats and makes it difficult to know how the applica-
tion components are performing and when remedial actions should be taken in the case 
of an anomaly. Nowadays, many cloud customers are becoming more interested in having 
a knowledge of their application status, particularly as it relates to the security of the 
application owing to growing cloud security concerns, which is multi-faceted in multi-
cloud environments. This has necessitated the need for adequate visibility and security 
awareness in multi-cloud environments. However, this is threatened by non-standardiza-
tion and diverse CSP platforms. 
 
This thesis presents a security evaluation framework for multi-cloud applications. It aims 
to facilitate transparency and security awareness in multi-cloud applications through ad-
equate evaluation of the application components deployed across different clouds as well 
as the entire multi-cloud application. This will ensure that the health, internal events and 
performance of the multi-cloud application can be known. As a result of this, the security 
status and information about the multi-cloud application can be made available to appli-
cation owners, cloud service providers and application users. This will increase cloud 
customers’ trust in using multi-clouds and ensure verification of the security status of 
multi-cloud components at any time desired. The security evaluation framework is based 
on threat identification and risk analysis, application modelling with ontology, selection 
of metrics and security controls, application security monitoring, security measurement, 
decision making and security status visualization. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the thesis background, the motivation, the problem statement, the 
objectives and research questions, the limitation and the thesis structure. 
1.1 Background 
Globalization has brought humans closer to one another in relation to how they relate, 
interact and carry out their business activities. Nowadays, it has even extended to the 
point of bringing humans and objects (i.e., devices and systems) closer to one another. 
However, in order to ensure seamless interaction between humans and objects, the need 
to embed some form of intelligence into these objects came up and led to the creation and 
development of smart objects or devices. According to [1], a smart object is a physical 
thing that has a sensor, an actuator, a low power radio and a microcontroller. Smart ob-
jects are designed and developed with the capability of being autonomous, self-aware, 
self-sustaining, energy efficient and self-governing [2]. These qualities have made it pos-
sible to create an ambience for human-object interaction and relationship. 
The embedding of microcontrollers in smart devices has given these devices capabilities 
to interact intelligently with other devices as well as the environment where they are de-
ployed [2]. The sensor perceives the environment; the microcontroller processes the 
measured data, makes logical decision and provides appropriate response, which is ef-
fected by the actuator. Smart objects have the capabilities of being context aware i.e. 
conscious about their status, location and surrounding environment. They can administer 
control, respond adequately to changes within their environment and they are capable of 
learning their environment [3]. The ambience where the interaction between humans and 
these devices occurs is called a smart environment. The concept of smart environments 
has been in existence for some time and it resulted from the need for automation, security 
and energy efficiency i.e., reduction of energy, maintenance and operational costs. 
The progresses recorded in supporting fields like sensor networks, robotics, artificial in-
telligence, mobile and pervasive computing have brought about further work and research 
in smart environments [3]. According to [4], a smart environment refers to an environ-
ment, which acquires and applies knowledge pertaining to the environment and its occu-
pants so as to enhance their feeling within the environment. Smart environments have 
physical (sensors and actuators), communication, information and decision engines. Typ-
ical applications are found in smart buildings, smart factories, smart phones, smart mo-
bility systems, smart homes and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), which embodies com-
putational, communication and physical processes e.g. smart grid. Communication is an 
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integral aspect of smart environments as the different components and devices in the en-
vironment interact with one another through the exchange of data and information. 
The advances recorded in the field of communication engineering led to the development 
of communication mechanisms like Wi-Fi, ZigBee, Bluetooth low energy [5], and com-
munication standards like 6LowPAN [6], [7] and this has positively affected the interac-
tion between humans and devices. Furthermore, the emergence of cloud computing has 
had a great effect on resource utilization, data storage and communication [8]. This is 
because with cloud computing, there is no need to increase or have a large storage space 
on local servers and host devices as there are remote servers, which handles and manages 
storage and processing of information. This has played a huge role in the deployment of 
smart devices because devices can be developed with a high processing power with little 
focus on storage and computational resources as these can be outsourced in the cloud 
thereby requiring the devices to pull the resources from different cloud platforms such as 
Google cloud, Amazon and Microsoft Azure [9]. 
Several resources such as email services, web servers, weather forecasts, database servers 
and search engines now run in the cloud. This means that smart devices have to connect 
to the cloud in order to utilize these resources. An example is when a user tries to use his 
mobile phone to access his information stored in Google drive. These resources are avail-
able as-a-service in the cloud. The goal of ensuring resource sharing or resource pooling 
gave rise to the concept of cloud computing. The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) [10] defines cloud computing as a platform based on resource shar-
ing, where resources e.g., applications are  consumed with negligible Cloud Service Pro-
vider (CSP) participation. Common CSPs are IBM Softlayer, Microsoft Azure, Google 
cloud and AWS [11]. 
Nowadays, many enterprises utilize cloud resources for several purposes in order to fulfill 
their business needs. Notably is the use of multi-clouds, where resources from different 
cloud providers are combined. For example, an enterprise can deploy a web server on 
Microsoft Azure while the database server may be hosted on Google Cloud. This can be 
attributed to associated benefits such as cost optimization, improved quality of service, 
prevention of vendor lock-in, and increased flexibility through availability of choice just 
to mention a few. The adoption of multi-clouds has also brought about the development 
of multi-cloud applications i.e., applications whose components are distributed across 
multiple clouds. The goal of utilizing multi-clouds and developing multi-cloud applica-
tions is to maximize or leverage on the unique capabilities of different CSPs by selecting 
the best mix of cloud deployments that helps to satisfy diverse customer needs as well as 
application requirements. 
According to the RightScale 2018 state of the cloud report [12], which was based on a 
survey carried out among 997 respondent organizations on their level of cloud adoption, 
it was discovered that 81% of the enterprises reported a multi-cloud strategy as shown in 
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Figure 1. In addition, the average amount of CSPs utilized by these enterprises was about 
five different clouds. This clearly shows that the use of multiple cloud resources has been 
enormously embraced by different enterprises for diverse business operations. However, 
even with numerous benefits of multi-cloud deployment and high level of adoption, the 
security of the multi-cloud environment remains a major challenge for many enterprises 
[12]. This is because the level of threats and vulnerabilities increases with increasing use 
of cloud resources and this poses some security concerns relating to the integrity, confi-
dentiality and availability of the data stored or processed within the environment. As 
smart devices consume services provided by multi-cloud applications hosted on multiple 
clouds, they become exposed to different threats and vulnerabilities. 
 
Figure 1. Enterprise cloud strategy [12] 
1.2 Motivation 
The internet plays a key role in cloud computing as interactions within the cloud and 
multi-cloud environment thrives on the availability of the internet. This has made it seam-
less for data and information exchange between diverse components in the multi-cloud 
environment. However, the open nature of the internet exposes devices, applications and 
multi-cloud components to various kinds of threats as malicious individuals may take 
advantage of it. In addition, the multi-cloud environment is heterogeneous in nature ow-
ing to diverse components spread across different clouds. This heterogeneous nature re-
sults in multiple attack surfaces and further exposes the environment to more threats. The 
open nature of the internet coupled with the heterogeneous nature of multi-clouds makes 
the multi-cloud environment complex. 
The complexity of the multi-cloud environment involves a high level of interactions be-
tween environment components. It introduces threats and makes it difficult to ascertain 
what is happening within the environment particularly as it relates to the internal events 
and security status of the application components i.e., how the application components 
are performing and when remedial actions are needed to be taken in the case of an anom-
aly. Threat detection and determination of application components’ performance require 
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multi-cloud environment visibility (i.e., transparency) and security state-awareness of 
multi-cloud application components and the entire multi-cloud environment. This will 
bring about the detection and mitigation of threats, which may impact the multi-cloud 
environment. The need for transparency and security awareness in multi-cloud environ-
ment has necessitated research in the field. This will surely be beneficial to multi-cloud 
application and infrastructure owners, as it will ease the burden of security management 
in multi-clouds environments. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
There is a growing need amongst cloud customers to become fully aware of performance, 
health and security status of applications hosted across different clouds. In particular, 
customers are interested in being able to ascertain that CSPs are truly fulfilling the agreed 
Service Level Agreement (SLA) as it concerns application security. In addition, multi-
cloud adoption is also increasing and so is the level of complexity of the multi-cloud 
environment. Therefore, there is need to ensure adequate environment transparency and 
security awareness in order to address this need. However, ensuring transparency and 
security awareness in multi-cloud environment can be challenging owing to non-stand-
ardization, diverse CSP platforms with different modes of operation and the dynamic na-
ture of the multi-cloud environment. In view of this, a multi-faceted but yet holistic secu-
rity approach is required. 
1.4 Objectives and Research Questions 
The realization of transparency and security awareness in multi-cloud environments will 
increase cloud consumers’ trust in using multi-clouds. It will also enable the verification 
of the security of multi-cloud components at any time required. The goal of this thesis is 
to demonstrate how transparency and security awareness can be achieved in multi-cloud 
environments. The hypothesis is that through adequate security evaluation, transparency 
and security awareness can be achieved in multi-cloud environments. This thesis thus 
proposes a framework that can be used to carry out security evaluation in multi-cloud 
applications. The security evaluation framework consists of different building blocks 
called engines, which provide several functionalities that include application modelling, 
security metrics monitoring, security measurement, decision making and security status 
visualization. 
The proposed security evaluation framework will bring about detection of threats, appli-
cation and environment monitoring and threat mitigation. This will help to achieve the 
desired level of transparency and security awareness within the multi-cloud environment 
and enable cloud customers and infrastructure owners to get adequate information about 
the health, performance and security status of their application. In summary, the research 
problem for the thesis can be formulated with the following bullet points; 
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 How to evaluate security for multi-cloud environment and get this information to 
the end-user of the application at the device? 
 How to implement transparency of multi-cloud systems in order to get awareness 
on the resources used for the application and their contribution to the security of 
the overall system? 
1.5 Limitation 
The scope of this thesis shall be within the domain of multiple clouds services i.e., the 
interaction and communication between multi-clouds offering different services and re-
sources. The focus shall not be on the mode of deployment like public, private or hybrid 
clouds. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured as follows; Chapter 2 introduces the thesis theoretical background 
while Chapter 3 presents the methodology detailing the proposed framework for security 
evaluation. In Chapter 4, the framework is validated using the TSM application as case 
study. Chapter 5 shows the results, Chapter 6, the discussion and finally in Chapter 7, the 
conclusions and future work is presented. 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter presents the review of existing literature and technology in smart environ-
ments, cloud computing and cloud systems, and multi-clouds. In addition, a review of 
different sub-areas of the main literatures, such as threat modelling, self-healing and self-
recovery is also presented. This chapter is divided into the following sections: Smart en-
vironments, Cloud computing and cloud systems, Multi-clouds and multi-cloud applica-
tions, Transparency and security awareness in multi-cloud environments and Summary 
of the state of the art. 
2.1 Smart Environments 
Smart environments acquire and apply knowledge about themselves and their occupants 
in order to enhance the feelings of their occupants within the environment. They possess 
sensing and reasoning attributes, which enhances knowledge acquisition and application. 
The acquisition and application of knowledge is based on data, which helps to generate 
information about the environment, which is used for decision making. Smart environ-
ments consist of different components, namely physical (sensors and actuators), commu-
nication, information and decision engines. They collaborate to make sensing and deci-
sion making possible. Figure 2 shows the basic architecture of the components and layers 
of a smart environment. 
 
Figure 2. The components of a smart environment [2] 
7 
There are several technologies utilized across the different layers of a smart environment. 
In the physical layer, sensor technology is employed for the detection and acquisition of 
sensory data. In addition, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN1) enhances the sharing of the 
data acquired between different sensors to make data available for processing and deci-
sion making. In the communication layer, wireless communication protocols such as In-
frared2, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi [5] are used to transmit data between different components 
within the environment. In the information layer, dedicated prediction algorithms and 
data mining techniques are used to process, analyze and interpret the data to make mean-
ingful information that will form the basis for decision making in the decision layer. The 
desired response is provided through device actuation utilizing technologies such as 
power line control [13]. Other supporting technologies utilized in smart environments 
include speech recognition, pattern recognition, adaptive control etc. 
Typical practical applications of smart environments include adaptive homes, smart 
rooms, smart offices, assistive environments for the elderly and individual with special 
needs, smart homes, smart buildings and smart cities.  It has become very common to also 
to refer to these applications as smart systems [14]. With the advent of internet of things, 
cyber-physical systems and advances in technologies associated with smart systems, 
many devices are now even more connected than before [15] and huge amount of data is 
transferred and exchanged seamlessly between these devices. This exchange even extends 
to the collection and use of personal data of users in the environment and it has raised 
several security concerns for the users particularly as it affects their trust and confidence. 
This has called for the need for transparency, security awareness and integration of ade-
quate security measures to meet these challenges. 
The main security challenges in smart environments include device integrity, communi-
cation channel security [16] and unauthorized access and user privacy [17]. As it concerns 
device integrity, challenges arise owing to device mobility between different smart envi-
ronments as devices may become exposed to threats in one environment, and may intro-
duce such threats to another environment. On the issue of privacy, data owners are mostly 
concerned about the use of their data owing to lack of trust and absence of knowledge of 
how their data is being used by different entities within the environment. This therefore 
requires that personal data be adequately protected from unauthorized use and disclosure. 
To achieve privacy, environment transparency and user awareness is required as data 
owners need to know how their data is being used, as it will form the basis upon which 
the consent will be given by the data owner to process and disclose his data. Lastly, on 
communication channel security, many devices in smart environments communicate us-
ing wireless protocols such as Bluetooth, ZigBee, Wi-Fi [5] and Infrared. However, as 
outlined in [16], these protocols are vulnerable and susceptible to different attacks such 
as eavesdropping due to their open nature, clear visibility and easy detection by other 
                                                 
1 http://www.ni.com/white-paper/7142/en/ 
2 https://www.elprocus.com/communication-using-infrared-technology/ 
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entities that may be around the environment. These entities may introduce threats into the 
environment if they have malicious intentions. Therefore, adequate security of these com-
munication channels is required to mitigate any possible threats. 
In view of the aforementioned challenges, security thus becomes a necessity in smart 
environments, as it is important to provide adequate security to ensure data protection, 
user privacy, device integrity and protection of communication channels. This will bring 
about an increase in user trust and confidence within the environment. The procedure for 
achieving this involves implementing a security approach that involves threat identifica-
tion and enforcement of effective countermeasures to mitigate identified threats. Pre-
cisely, it involves threat modelling, effective management of device security and the in-
corporation of self-healing capabilities in smart environments. 
2.1.1 Threat Modelling in Smart Environments 
Threat modelling is a methodology for carrying out the security analysis of a system in 
order to discover the threats and malicious events that are likely to affect the system. It 
helps to ascertain areas and system components where mitigation actions should be ap-
plied in order to maintain system security. Several studies have been carried out in mod-
elling threats in smart environments and different methodologies have been proposed. A 
survey of some of them is provided in the next paragraphs. 
Malik et al. [18] propose a 7-step approach for modelling threats in pervasive environ-
ments. Preliminary work begins with the definition of users and their roles to ensure au-
thorized access. The main approach involves identification of system domain, identifica-
tion of trust levels, identification of threats, quantification and estimation of risk based on 
financial implications of threat, and specification and selection of the most cost effective 
countermeasures. The approach concludes with the detection of new threats and vulnera-
bilities earlier unidentified in the system by using a tool such as Common Vulnerability 
Scoring System (CVSS). This approach is iterative and expansive in nature as any emerg-
ing threat can be easily discovered and appropriate countermeasures can be applied. 
Martins et al. [19] propose a threat modelling methodology for cyber-physical systems. 
In this methodology, threat modelling is performed based on component-to-component 
interactions (i.e. data exchange and communication) by using Data Flow Diagrams (DFD) 
to model the interactions. It is followed by the identification of threats for each of the 
interactions using the STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclo-
sure, Denial of Service and Elevation of privileges) methodology [20] to model the threats 
for each interaction. The authors recommended that controls and countermeasures from 
prominent industrial standards such as NIST “SP 800-82 Rev. 2” [21] should be applied 
to mitigate the threats. This methodology further widens the threat identification process 
by identifying threats at the communication layer. 
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Wang et al. [22] presents a methodology for performing threat modeling in smart city 
systems from both technical and business perspective (i.e. software, hardware, policies 
and business operations). The approach named Hardware, intelligence, Software, Policies 
and Operation (HiSPO) further extends the process of threat modelling by identifying 
threats on the network, host, application, security policy and operational security levels. 
The STRIDE methodology is used to categorize the threats and is followed by a risk as-
sessment process. Furthermore, with the aid of a specialized algorithm, the threat factor 
is computed and it represents the security level of the system. Mitigation strategies are 
also provided based on the threat factor. This threat modeling process is iterative and is 
aimed at reducing the threat factor as much as possible. 
Beckers et al. [23] presents an approach for a systematic threat analysis in a smart meter-
ing gateway system. It includes scope definition, asset identification, domain knowledge 
consideration, description of attackers, identification of threats and general documenta-
tion. The domain knowledge contains information (facts and assumptions) about the pos-
sible protection of the assets and it is used to generate the textual documentation. This 
documentation represents the threat model, which gives the security analysis of the smart 
metering gateway system. This approach is also iterative in nature as each step is contin-
uously checked in order to accommodate any vital activity not incorporated earlier on. It 
also provides a detail description of the attacker’s abilities. 
The approach presented in [23] was extended in [24] with the inclusion of an additional 
step i.e., identification of entry points and vulnerability analysis. The approach was then 
applied to identify security threats in smart homes. The approach also relies on the use of 
Microsoft security development lifecycle (SDL) and context-pattern for scenario descrip-
tion. Based on the assets identified, the possible entry points through which an attacker 
can access the assets are identified and the STRIDE methodology is used to specify the 
threats for each entry points. Following this, the possible actions of the attacker on the 
assets are analyzed based on the entry points and STRIDE threats, using an attack path 
DFD. The path DFD diagrams help to show how the attacker can harm the asset. 
The different studies reviewed in the foregoing paragraphs highlight different techniques 
and methodologies for modelling threats in smart environments. The methodologies have 
some steps in common which are asset identification, threat identification and provision 
of countermeasures. It therefore means that identifying the assets in a smart environment 
is very relevant for the identification of threats and provision of countermeasures. It fol-
lows also that efficient mechanisms are integrated to make the environment detect threats 
and possible attacks. In essence, the environment should be equipped with capabilities to 
discover, mitigate and recover from possible attacks. 
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2.1.2 Self-healing and Self-recovery in Smart Environments 
According to Ghosh et al. [25], Self-healing features makes it possible for a system to 
know when it is not in correct operating condition and performs necessary alteration to 
regularize itself through reconfiguration and fault recovery. In more details, it is the po-
tential of a system to detect an anomaly in its mode of operation, examine the anomaly 
and carry out actions to repair the anomaly and restore itself back to normal working 
condition without the need for any human intervention. This means that such a system is 
ably equipped with functionalities to identify what an abnormal working operation is, 
prevent and react to such anomaly and apply the set of rules governing the repair and 
recovery from such faults in the system in real-time. The main attributes of self-healing 
systems are detecting, diagnosing and recovering [26] i.e. automatic discovery of faults 
and correction of faults, errors or anomalies. 
The attributes of self-healing systems also form its building blocks and extend beyond 
automatic discovery and correction of faults. Other attributes such as analysis and plan-
ning are also part of the self-healing process. The self-healing process follows the ap-
proach of autonomic computing system defined by IBM in [27]. It includes monitoring 
(sensing), analyzing (prediction or estimation), planning (selection) and executing (re-
covery) together with a knowledge base, which serves as a repository of rules and policies 
for applying and enacting the four processes. Some studies have been conducted in the 
area of self-healing systems. However, at the state of the art, there is no particular univer-
sally accepted scope, standard, architecture or model for representing the building blocks 
of a self-healing system [28]. Different architectures and frameworks have been presented 
and proposed but a common occurrence is that they are all a spin-off of the four main 
processes of autonomic computing systems. 
Pereira et al. [28] presents a self-healing middleware used to develop distributed applica-
tions based on On-demand Service Assembly and Delivery (OSAD) model. Middleware 
aids interoperability in a distributed environment. The implementation of self-healing 
based on the OSAD model utilizes component redundancy. It consists of four main 
blocks/processes, namely application monitoring, failure detection, alternative compo-
nent discovery and replacement of failed component. It starts with continuous monitoring 
of applications running on virtual containers in order to identify the application proper-
ties, relationships and inter-dependencies. At the failure of any of the application compo-
nents, a replacement is immediately searched using the lookup and discovery service and 
the appropriate alternative component is invoked and the failed component replaced in 
order to ensure normalcy. The model is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. The lifecycle of self-healing behaviour in OSAD model [28] 
Sharmin et al. [29] also presents a middleware called Middleware Adaptability for Re-
source Discovery, Knowledge Usability and Self-healing (MARKS), that is well suited 
for pervasive computing environment. It consists of components (object request broker 
(ORB), universal service access unit, trust management, and resource discovery) and ser-
vices (self-healing, knowledge usability and context-service). Figure 4 shows the 
MARKS architecture. 
 
Figure 4. MARKS architecture [29] 
The Self-healing unit of MARKS consists of the healing manager and resource manager, 
and the unit’s process involves fault detection, fault notification and resource recovery. It 
continuously monitors the devices by querying and analyzing the ‘rate of change of sta-
tus’ messages generated from the devices. This could be ‘OK’ or ‘SOS’. If the device 
returns no message or ‘SOS’ message, it translates to a fault. The unit then notifies the 
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healing manager to initiate recovery procedure, which begins with isolating the faulty 
device and searching for an alternative. At the same time, the information on the faulty 
device is shared among active devices to service restoration and continuity. The self-
healing architecture is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Self-healing unit architecture [29] 
The studies reviewed in the foregoing paragraphs show different approaches or methods 
for achieving self-healing in smart environments. It revealed that the basic functional re-
quirements for bringing about self-healing in smart environments are monitoring, detec-
tion, notification and recovery & restoration. These functionalities have to be enshrined 
in the operational setup of smart environments to ensure anomaly detection and continu-
ous operation of the environment. In addition to self-healing, it is also important to have 
measures in place to manage device security in a bid enhance proactivity regarding secu-
rity management. 
2.1.3 Managing Device Security in Smart Environments 
In smart environments, the application and enforcement of security occurs at different 
layers; one of such is the device layer. Smart environments accommodate several devices, 
some of which are very mobile such as the ones carried by humans who regularly make 
use of the environment. Owing to this mobility, these devices may be transported and 
used in other smart environments and as a result, they become vulnerable and exposed to 
threats that may be available in the environment. In the event of a device being compro-
mised by threats in one environment, it becomes capable of introducing such threats when 
taken into another environment. As such, it becomes necessary therefore to ensure that 
the security of devices is effectively managed in order to protect them against any form 
of threats or attacks as well as the possible introduction of such threats into the smart 
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environment. This includes the enforcement of policies and application of relevant secu-
rity mechanisms. The next paragraphs present some relevant works. 
McAvoy et al. [30] propose the use of ontology for context-management of smart envi-
ronments, which also includes ontological modelling of sensor data. It utilizes semantic 
descriptions for enabling automatic identification of sensors when added to the environ-
ment. The proposed context-management system consists of five components, namely 
device, sensor ontology, enrichment, semantic repository, Application Programming In-
terface (API) query & retrieval. Sensor ontology component enables the addition of new 
devices based on the data it receives from them and the enrichment component contains 
a reasoning engine, which processes the data before sending it to the semantic repository 
component. Applications can then make use of the processed data through API queries. 
In addition, the authors implemented a new "plug-n-measure" procedure that ensures ac-
quisition of data and update of contextual data to the semantic repository. 
This approach presented in [30] ensures that new devices can be efficiently added to smart 
environments with less amount of time and effort. However, it fails to address the issue 
of security of the added device. An improvement on this approach could be the inclusion 
of device security configuration. In addition, information about the required level of se-
curity that has to be maintained in the environment by all the devices could be specified 
in the semantic repository. This information is made available as security metrics. There-
fore, when a new device is added, the sensor ontology component receives data from the 
device including its security information and then sends it to the enrichment component 
for comparison with the security metrics stored in the semantic repository component. If 
the required metrics is met, the device is immediately added but if not, a rejection is made 
immediately. 
Evesti and Ovaska [31] suggest an ontology-based security adaptation at run-time for the 
security management of smart spaces. The adaptation process involves two phases 
namely, start-up phase and run-time phase. The start-up phase is initiated when a new 
device joins the smart space. At the introduction of the new device, the security require-
ments, security levels and the security mechanisms that support the requirements for the 
operation of the smart space are retrieved from the security ontology. The applicable se-
curity mechanisms are selected and the security level of the device is measured. If the 
measured levels do not meet the security requirements specified in the security ontology, 
the run-time adaptation is executed. The initiation of the run-time phase adaptation im-
plies non-conformance and detection of threat within the environment and when this oc-
curs, the environment adjusts by applying the appropriate security mechanism needed to 
mitigate the threat. The security adaptation process is illustrated in Figure 6. 
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The above studies have highlighted the importance and effectiveness of ontology for se-
curity management as seen in its use for the modelling and specification of security re-
quirements, security metrics, security levels, security mechanisms and other security pa-
rameters. 
 
Figure 6. Security adaptation process [31] 
2.2 Cloud Computing and Cloud Systems 
Cloud computing involves making computing services available to users at the desired 
time, location and quantity [32]. The associated cost depends on the amount of resources 
consumed and this is of great benefit to individuals and establishments, as they do not 
have to spend heavily on maintaining IT infrastructures. In simple terms, cloud computing 
is based on a pay-as-you-consume model and it allows establishments to focus on their 
core expertise. According to NIST [33], there are three fundamental cloud computing 
service models, namely Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) 
and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) as shown in Figure 7. Nowadays, new services are 
emerging such as network-as-a-service specified by ITU-T and data-as-as-service as de-
fined in ISO/IEC 17826:2016 [34]. This has been largely due to the benefits of cloud 
computing. 
However, even with the cloud computing benefits, the issue of security still affects its 
usage by enterprises. As presented in [10], security is a major cloud challenge, particu-
larly relating to privacy risks and data loss. This is because privacy and data security are 
of utmost concern for many cloud users. Therefore, identifying the security challenges in 
cloud computing becomes very important. This can be achieved by evaluating cloud com-
puting bearing in mind an attacker’s intention, as it will help to reveal his most likely 
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actions. Identifying and analyzing security challenges will facilitate countermeasure de-
termination. This will enable the proper selection of techniques, tools and mechanisms 
needed to mitigate the security challenges and through this; enterprises will have confi-
dence using cloud resources. 
 
Figure 7. Cloud computing service models [35] 
2.2.1 Security Challenges in Cloud Computing 
Security is concerned with the provision and enforcement of safeguards to protect a re-
source of great value. Traditionally and as it applies to information security, the basic 
goal is to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability. In cloud computing, the provi-
sion of security extends beyond these basic objectives as it becomes vital to manage and 
control access to data stored in the cloud, incorporate measures for attack resilience and 
detection of threats etc. This becomes necessary as the risk of exposure grows with in-
creasing numbers of cloud consumers as well as the discovery of new threats. Several 
cloud security challenges have been identified through different studies and different mit-
igation techniques and mechanisms have also been proposed to address the challenges. A 
review of relevant studies for identifying cloud security challenges is presented in the 
next paragraphs. 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [36] presents an approach for 
detecting and combating threats in the development of software applications. The ap-
proach offers a procedure to identify, rate and tackle security risks in an application. It 
involves three steps i.e., the decomposition of application, discovery and rating of threats, 
and discovery of control measures. OWASP classifies the application threats as STRIDE. 
The foundation also proposes the use of encryption, hashing, authentication, the protec-
tion of secret data, use of privacy-enhanced protocols, authorization and use of digital 
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signatures as countermeasures to minimize identified risks. The approach presented by 
OWASP is generic but may be extended and used in cloud computing domain. 
Another approach is presented in [37] where the issue of cloud security was studied from 
four aspects namely, cloud service delivery, cloud architecture, cloud stakeholders and 
cloud offered characteristics. The authors mention that cloud security issues are ingrained 
in isolation, access control, virtualization, security management and multi-tenancy. Fol-
lowing their analysis of cloud security issues, they recommended that the solutions to 
cloud computing issues should be adaptive, support integration with other security con-
trols and use models, which ensures that users can only access their own security config-
urations. 
Johnson E. Robert [38] states that the rate of consumption of cloud resources surpasses 
the rate of cloud security tools development. The author mentions that the use of cloud 
resources has brought about new security challenges that can be addressed by modifying 
conventional security controls. He identifies security threats like Structured Query Lan-
guage (SQL) injection, Buffer Overflow and Cross Site Scripting. He mentions that pri-
vacy and auditing issues have become paramount in cloud computing. He proposes re-
mote integrity monitoring, encryption and virtual private storage proxy as methods of 
preventing illegal access, increasing and augmenting the security in the cloud. 
According to Akhil Behl [39], cloud computing benefits also attracts various threats. The 
author mentions that security responsibility should be handled by both CSP and cloud 
customer. He identifies loss of control, insider threats, data loss, multi-tenancy, service 
disruptions and outsider malicious attacks as cloud security challenges. He also proposes 
the use of strong authentication, firewalls, authorization, intrusion detection systems, data 
integrity mechanisms and properly defined SLA as countermeasures to mitigate the iden-
tified security challenges. 
Security breaches will have an effect on many cloud customers. Its prevention and control 
involve identifying cloud security challenges and developing security mechanisms and 
tools for tackling the challenges. The studies reviewed in the previous paragraphs have 
brought about the identification of the major cloud computing security challenges as well 
as the methods and mechanisms required to counter them. These mechanisms can be de-
veloped into security tools that can be used with cloud applications to address security 
issues. 
2.3 Multi-clouds and Multi-cloud Applications 
Multi-clouds refer to the utilization of multiple cloud services by an enterprise to meet a 
business objective. This may involve using different CSPs for the same service model, 
for different cloud service models or for distributed applications. A simple example might 
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be an enterprise using multiple IaaS providers to host a particular application, an enter-
prise that uses different CSPs to meet its IaaS, PaaS and SaaS needs or an enterprise that 
decides to split an application into various components and host the components using 
different CSPs. Another example could be a combination of a personal data center (pri-
vate cloud) and a public cloud provider. This may be necessary when an enterprise needs 
to have some form of control over the type of data or information they outsource to CSPs 
for storage. 
Multi-cloud application on the other hand refers to an application, which is broken down 
into various components, with the components distributed across different clouds [40]. 
Multi-cloud applications follow the concept of distributed computing where components 
are dispersed but made to communicate and interact in a consolidated or coordinated 
fashion in order to achieve a desired goal. These components may be services, containers 
or micro-services. The entire process occurs as if it were just a single application. Multi-
cloud computing allows multi-cloud applications to adopt the use of different cloud ser-
vices (IaaS, PaaS and SaaS) from different CSPs. This means that the distributed compo-
nents can be deployed in the separate clouds for their operations as CSPs can be selected 
according to the components and application requirements. 
The development of a multi-cloud application involves several stages, which involves  
design, development, deployment and run-time [41]. The multi-cloud application creation 
begins with the design of the application. In the design stage, the application is modelled 
by specifying the application architecture (i.e., the application components, interactions 
and mode of communication) and the specification of the requirements (i.e., hardware, 
cloud resources, location, operating system etc.). This will form the basis for the devel-
opment of the multi-cloud application SLA. The next stage is development and it involves 
building the multi-cloud application components as specified in the design stage using 
relevant software and technologies e.g. Java, JavaScript. 
The process continues with the deployment of the multi-cloud application in cloud envi-
ronment. It involves installation, configuration, testing and provisioning of cloud re-
sources e.g. servers, virtual machines. In this stage, the services and CSPs that satisfy the 
application requirements are specified. This results in the creation of the deployment 
script, which contains all information needed for deployment execution. Common tools 
used for deployment are Chef, Puppet and Ansible [42], [43]. The last stage is run-time. 
In this stage, the multi-cloud application runs on different cloud infrastructures where it 
has been deployed. The application is monitored to observe its performance and detect 
any anomaly or violation. In the event of an anomaly, notification is sent to trigger and 
enforce appropriate remedial actions i.e., countermeasure or security control. 
Multi-cloud deployments present an approach for maximizing the benefits and potentials 
of different cloud providers. It offers the opportunity to have the best mix of CSP offer-
ings that best satisfies business objectives and application requirements. Through this, 
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key factors such as performance and cost can be optimized. The benefits of multi-cloud 
computing are presented in the next section. 
2.3.1 Benefits of Multi-cloud Computing 
There are several reasons why an enterprise may decide to use multi-clouds for its oper-
ation. These reasons are entrenched in the benefits of multi-clouds, which include the 
prevention of vendor lock-in, reduction of cost, flexibility of choice of CSPs, disaster 
recovery, service redundancy, cost optimization, load balancing, improvement of quality 
of service etc. [44], [45]. In order to fully enjoy the benefits of multi-clouds, it is important 
that enterprises clearly understand their needs and how to make the appropriate selections 
to fulfill them. This begins with identifying business objectives (e.g., operational and fi-
nancial) and application requirements (e.g., functional and technical) and then determin-
ing and selecting the appropriate cloud service model(s) and CSPs that satisfies the re-
quirements.  The service mix and CSP selection may require the sound knowledge and 
expertise of in-house IT personnel. The benefits of multi-clouds are discussed in the next 
paragraphs. 
Multi-clouds help in the prevention of vendor lock-in [44]. This clearly points to the pre-
vention of over-dependence on one cloud provider. In this setup, two or more CSPs are 
used and cloud consumers can leave one cloud provider to another at any time when they 
feel the need to do so owing to cost, unsatisfactory service, unavailability of service or 
the discovery of better service offering by a different cloud provider. It offers them flex-
ibility of choice that provides them with the opportunity to transit to the CSP that best 
suits them. The main issue to address here is interoperability between CSPs as it has a 
great influence on the smooth transition of data between different cloud providers. 
Multi-cloud deployment enables cloud consumers to control their risks by distributing it 
across different clouds [45]. This is evident in the case of data availability, disaster re-
covery and fail-over services. For example, if several instances of a particular service are 
deployed in about three different public clouds, it is possible to ensure the continuous 
provisioning and running of the service even in the event of the primary cloud being shut 
down or unavailable as the service continues to run in the other clouds. This is a simple 
scenario of fail-over. Generally, this can be achieved using clusters [46], [47]. Just as in 
the case of data availability, the main data is stored in a primary cloud and its replicas 
created and stored in two other different clouds (secondary clouds) provided by a different 
CSP. Continuous availability is ensured when the data is provided by secondary clouds 
when the primary cloud fails. With this setup, data availability may be guaranteed when-
ever the data owner needs to access it. 
Multi-clouds make it possible to take advantage of the strengths of various cloud provid-
ers [44]. The strengths of CSPs are seen as their core competence, and are entrenched in 
the types of cloud models, and cloud services that they offer. e.g., CSP ‘A’ may be a better 
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provider of IaaS than CSP ‘B’ probably because CSP ‘B’ focuses more on providing 
PaaS. In the provision of these services, variations such as performance, costs and cov-
erage exist, and which are what cloud users capitalize on and use as metrics for measuring 
and determining the suitability of CSPs for their operations. This makes it possible there-
fore for cloud consumers to take advantage of these differences to get the best of cloud 
service offerings by different CSPs. This will even provide cloud consumers with the 
opportunity to get the best mix of solutions and services offered by different CSPs ac-
cording to how best they satisfy their needs. Through this, the best CSP satisfying a par-
ticular need can be selected and enterprises can reduce their costs and achieve a good 
balance in the consumption of cloud services. 
In the aspect of data location and in particular where data governance applies in the loca-
tion of data, the use of multiple clouds may also be beneficial. For instance, in a situation 
where user data (relating to the use of a particular application) has to be stored within 
certain locations owing to the requirements of data protection laws, it becomes very im-
portant to ensure that the data resides within that location. However, in the event that the 
desired CSP does not have a data center within the location, it becomes a problem ful-
filling data governance (data storage) requirements. The use of multi-clouds helps to ad-
dress this problem as user data can be stored in the facilities of a CSP within the region 
while the other application components and underlying services are hosted in the other 
desired CSP. With this arrangement, effective communication between the different CSPs 
must be adequately addressed particularly in the areas of coordination and security of 
communication channels. 
Another reason for the utilization of multi-clouds is the need for confidentiality and re-
duction of latency. For instance, even with the previously highlighted benefits of multi-
clouds, certain enterprises might still decide not to put certain data or information in pub-
lic clouds owing to data privacy. For this, they might decide to keep very sensitive data 
and information on-premise (i.e., in their private cloud facility) while they outsource less 
sensitive information to desired CSPs. This gives the enterprise great control over their 
data. As it concerns latency reduction, multi-clouds may be used to achieve this particu-
larly when an enterprise’ customers are domiciled in different regions. Latency reduction 
is achieved by bringing the service closer to the customers through the use of different 
CSPs located within customers’ regions. This will bring about faster response time and 
customer satisfaction. 
In the foregoing paragraphs, the benefits of multi-clouds have been highlighted and dis-
cussed. These benefits have been the reason for its growing adoption. However, it is im-
portant to mention that despite its increasing adoption, security is still a concern as stated 
in [12]. This is associated with the increasing level of risks owing to the distributed nature 
of the multi-cloud environment. This increasing level of risks amounts to increasing 
threats and vulnerabilities, which contributes to the security challenges in multi-clouds. 
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It is important to properly identify these security challenges as well as the countermeas-
ures needed to tackle them. Through this, the multi-cloud environment becomes more 
secure and consumers’ confidence in using multi-clouds increases. In this next section, 
the main security challenges in multi-clouds are discussed. 
2.3.2 Security Challenges in Multi-cloud Computing 
The implementation of multi-clouds requires the enforcement of multi-protection [48]. 
This is largely attributed to the dynamism and complexity of the multi-cloud environ-
ment, which involves the use of different interfaces and endpoints to establish interactions 
and communication between different environment components. Increased number of in-
terfaces and endpoints contribute to increased risks and vulnerabilities as the attack sur-
faces become multiplied and can be exploited by adversaries to perpetuate different at-
tacks and malicious activities. Hence the need for multiple protection to secure the mul-
tiple attack surfaces. As a way of addressing this need, different attempts have been made 
towards identifying the security challenges in multi-clouds. This will serve as a great in-
put for providing the needed level of protection in the multi-cloud environment. The se-
curity challenges that have been identified through different studies are presented in the 
next paragraphs. 
As outlined in [49], the main security challenges in multi-clouds are establishing trust 
among CSPs, data privacy, loss of control over data and policy heterogeneity. On the 
issue of trust, the challenge arises as many cloud customers delegate total security of their 
assets (e.g., applications) to their CSPs. This exposes the assets to risks such as insider 
threats, which could even multiply as data is transferred between CSPs and other third-
party organizations. This clearly raises trust concerns as cloud customers lose control and 
visibility, and become unaware of who might be accessing the asset as well as how secu-
rity is being administered over it. As it concerns data privacy, when sharing and using 
multiple customer data for research and analytical purposes for instance, it is important 
that data privacy is ensured so as not to reveal sensitive and personal information of dif-
ferent customers as required by data protection laws. At the same time, measures must 
also be taken to ensure data usability. Lastly on policy heterogeneity, different CSPs have 
unique security policies, which mostly leads to conflicts and breaches during integration 
owing to non-standardization. It is important to ensure policy harmonization through ad-
equate standardization to detect conflicts and resolve policy inconsistencies. 
To address the aforementioned challenges, the authors proposed the use of proxies as 
intermediaries for enabling effective cooperation between applications distributed across 
multiple clouds. They stated that the use of proxies will help to achieve trust between 
cloud customers and CSPs. It will also help to tackle policy heterogeneity through detec-
tion and resolution of policy anomalies. The authors also proposed the use of data pertur-
bation (addition of noise to data) as a means of ensuring data privacy. 
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In [50], the main multi-cloud security challenge highlighted is the inappropriate access to 
personal data and VMs, which may result in the breach of data privacy. The need for the 
protection of private data cannot be over-emphasized as already highlighted in previous 
paragraphs. To address this challenge, the authors proposed a model-driven architecture 
to ensure security and grant users their personal spaces within the multi-cloud environ-
ment. The PaaSage multi-cloud platform [50] was used as a case study. The proposed 
solution tackles inappropriate access to personal data and VMs through the enforcement 
of adequate authentication and authorization when consuming services by the PaaSage 
platform. It allocates dedicated information spaces to organization and their users and 
provides APIs that allows each organization’s administrators to securely manage their 
information space within the platform (i.e., management of security policies, users, roles, 
permissions etc.). 
In the foregoing paragraphs, multi-cloud security challenges have been identified follow-
ing the study of some research works. The studies show that the main security challenges 
in multi-clouds are data privacy, trust, loss of control over data and policy heterogeneity. 
However, beyond the identified challenges, the need for visibility (transparency) and se-
curity awareness in multi-cloud environments was also highlighted. This will ensure that 
application owners will have a clear knowledge of activities and events taking place 
within the multi-cloud environment and will be able to react accordingly to achieve the 
desired level of security in the environment. In the next section, the transparency and 
security awareness in multi-clouds are presented. 
2.4 Transparency and Security Awareness in Multi-cloud Envi-
ronments 
As illustrated in the introductory chapter, the complexity of the multi-cloud environment 
and the growing need of cloud customers to become more aware of the security of their 
application has mandated the need for transparency and security awareness. It has become 
necessary to provide a means through which application owners and cloud customers can 
ascertain the occurrences and security situations of their assets (e.g., applications, data, 
information) hosted or stored across multiple clouds. Specifically, cloud customers want 
to be sure that CSPs are respecting agreed SLA especially regarding application security. 
Transparency refers to a state of visibility, clarity or openness. It ensures that nothing is 
hidden. Security awareness refers to a condition of being conscious about the state of 
security of an entity e.g., an asset or a space. 
Transparency will ensure that all internal events, activities and interactions between the 
entities in multi-cloud environments are visible to application owners and cloud custom-
ers. Security awareness will ensure that application owners and cloud customers can ver-
ify the security state or status of the assets and the entire environment. It involves both 
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user-awareness and component-awareness. Through transparency and security aware-
ness, multi-cloud application components can be duly monitored, anomalies can be pre-
vented, detected and mitigated; and normalcy restored within the environment. This will 
be beneficial to multi-cloud users, as it will enhance control over personal assets and ease 
the burden of security management in multi-clouds environments. However, it requires 
implementing processes that are adaptable and CSP independent. 
Transparency and security awareness requires that efficient mechanisms for specifying 
multi-cloud application requirements, monitoring multi-cloud application, detecting 
threats, applying countermeasures, determining and reporting security status should be 
integrated into the multi-cloud environment. This can be achieved through security eval-
uation of the multi-cloud environment. This is because evaluating the multi-cloud com-
ponents and the multi-cloud environment will bring about the determination of the true 
status of the components and the environment in terms of health, performance and secu-
rity. This will ensure visibility and knowledge about the environment and its entities. In 
this thesis, a framework for enabling security evaluation of multi-clouds is proposed. 
The framework will facilitate anomaly detection, multi-cloud environment monitoring 
and application of appropriate countermeasures to mitigate threats. Specifically, it will 
provide the following functions, namely application modelling, security monitoring, se-
curity measurement, decision making and security status visualization. The combination 
of these functions will bring about a transparent and security-aware multi-cloud environ-
ment, which will improve customers’ trust and confidence in using multi-clouds. 
2.5 Summary of the State of the Art 
In the foregoing sub-sections, the most significant topics relating to this thesis have been 
presented. The technological advancements and the different research conducted in the 
fields of smart environments, cloud computing and multi-clouds have formed a good ba-
sis for developing multi-cloud applications and this has brought about an increase in the 
level of use of multiple cloud resources, particularly as it concerns choosing the best mix 
of the resources. However, the multifaceted nature of the multi-cloud environment raises 
several security concerns, particularly regarding transparency and security awareness, 
which has made it burdensome to determine the security condition of the environment 
and the applications it hosts, and has therefore necessitated the need to develop an ap-
proach for evaluating security in multi-cloud environments as presented in this thesis. 
The proposed security evaluation framework ensures that the security levels of compo-
nents hosted across different clouds as well as the entire multi-cloud environment can be 
realized. This addresses the security concerns surrounding transparency and security 
awareness as cloud customers, application owners and administrators will have full 
knowledge of the security state and wellbeing of their application and the entire multi-
cloud environment. It will further ensure that threats can be identified, mitigated, and 
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required level of performance of the application and the multi-cloud environment is main-
tained. Security evaluation in multi-cloud environments will promote visibility, security 
awareness and upgrade customers’ credence, using multiple cloud resources. The proce-
dures for realizing this framework are explained in the next chapter. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
The proposed security evaluation framework will provide a methodology for evaluating 
security in multi-cloud applications. It is made up of different components called engines, 
which are responsible for providing different operations. In this section, the framework 
operations, architectural view and the components’ functionalities are described. 
3.1 Framework Operations 
The proposed security evaluation framework consists of the following operations, namely 
threat identification and risk analysis, selection of metrics and security controls, applica-
tion modelling, application security monitoring, security measurement, decision making 
and security status visualization. Figure 8 shows a diagrammatic illustration of the secu-
rity evaluation framework methodology. The description of each operation is also pro-
vided in the next sections. 
 
Figure 8. Security evaluation framework methodology 
3.1.1 Threat Identification and Risk Analysis 
Threat identification and risk analysis are the first operations in the proposed security 
evaluation framework. Threat identification involves the specification of all factors af-
fecting the security of the application, leading to the determination of threats while risk 
analysis involves ranking the identified threats to determine their level of criticality. 
Threat identification depends on the peculiarity of the application (i.e., whether it is a 
software or storage application) and it is carried out by analyzing the application based 
on its components and their interactions i.e., identifying threats by specifying the likely 
actions and factors that may impact the components as well as their mode of interactions. 
Threat identification is achieved through threat modelling. A review of different threat 
modelling techniques is presented in [51]. The approach recommended by OWASP [36], 
which is based on STRIDE methodology [20] will be used in this thesis. 
Risk analysis follows the identifications of threats. It is performed on each threat and per 
application component. It involves evaluating and rating each identified threat in order to 
determine the potential extent of the damage to the component in the event of an attack. 
This is very essential as it helps to identify the critical component(s) of the application 
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that requires adequate protection. Specifically, risk analysis is carried out by estimating 
the probability of occurrence and impact of each threat using quantitative risk models 
(where risk is a product of probability and impact) or value-based models such as DREAD 
(Damage potential, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users and Discoverability) 
[36]. Threat identification and risk analysis are important steps for identifying threats, 
determining critical components and selecting security controls. The approach presented 
in [52] illustrates how this can be achieved in multi-cloud applications. 
3.1.2 Selection of Metrics and Security Controls 
The next operation that follows the identification of threats is the selection of metrics and 
security controls. Metrics selection involves specifying monitorable parameters while the 
selection of controls involves specifying countermeasures for threat mitigation. Metrics 
are quantifiable parameters that can be monitored or measured to get certain information 
about the application performance, characteristics or behaviours. Metrics are defined and 
selected according to the desires of the application owner. They are aligned to certain 
properties or defined security objectives that clearly reflect the application characteristics 
or behaviours that are of great interest to the application owner. For instance, Availability 
can be a property, with average response time as the metric. Metrics also have threshold 
values, which when violated could result in a threat. The research works in [53]–[55] 
propose a set of metrics that can be used for monitoring the security level in multi-cloud 
applications. 
The selection of security controls is an essential step required for the mitigation of iden-
tified threats. It involves identifying and selecting the countermeasures needed to tackle 
anomalies and restore the application back to a safe condition. The selection of security 
controls requires a good understanding of the identified threats. This is because having a 
good knowledge of the identified threats will aid the selection of security controls that are 
adequate for mitigating the threats. Security controls can be selected by adopting meth-
odologies formulated by different security control frameworks and standards such as 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev.4 [56], Cloud Security Alliance “Cloud control matrix” (CCM) 
[57]. 
3.1.3 Application Modelling 
Application modelling involves specifying the multi-cloud application requirements. 
These requirements include application component description (name, type and number 
of replicas), CSP information, geographical location, organization (i.e., application 
owner) details, threats, security metrics, security controls, violation thresholds, VM re-
quirements (hardware, OS, RAM and number of cores), communication ports and modes 
of interaction. Application modelling is very important as it provides a means to describe 
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the application and its requirements thereby enabling proper understanding of the appli-
cation functionalities and its interactions. Simply put, it ensures application definition and 
system understanding. Application modelling can be done using modelling languages 
such as CloudML [58], OWL (Ontology Web Language) [59], UMLSec [60], SecAM 
[61]. In this thesis, multi-cloud application is modelled with ontology using OWL. 
Ontologies express knowledge in a formal manner [62]. It encapsulates knowledge about 
a specific domain and helps to describe its logical structures. It promotes knowledge shar-
ing and reuse among different entities and allows making informed inferencing, facilitates 
reasoning and aids quality decision making. Ontologies are made up of concepts (classes), 
relationships, attributes and instances and have a wide application in software engineer-
ing, artificial intelligence and semantic web. Ontologies are suitable for modelling dy-
namic systems (i.e., systems with constantly changing information). In multi-cloud envi-
ronments for instance, the use of ontology will ensure that rapidly changing information 
(entities, events, interactions and security status) in the environment can be adequately 
captured and updated. This will bring about responsiveness, self-awareness and self-
learning in the system. 
Ontologies have been applied in modelling information systems security and have re-
sulted in the development of security ontologies as seen in [63]–[68], where ontologies 
have been applied for risk management, vulnerabilities detection, intrusion detection and 
presentation of general security overview. Furthermore, in the field of cloud computing, 
ontologies have been applied for modelling interactions, security measures, factors and 
controls as presented in [69]–[71]. Security ontologies provide a means for representing 
security domain knowledge. It begins the definition of security concepts and description 
of the relationships between them. As it concerns the multi-cloud environment, the con-
cepts are the multi-cloud application requirements, which includes asset or application 
component, CSP, organization, threats, security metrics, security controls, VM require-
ments etc., while the relationships are the interactions that exist between the concepts. 
Figure 9 shows a snippet of the entity-relationship diagram for this thesis. 
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Figure 9. Entity-relationship diagram 
The result of the application modelling operation is the multi-cloud application security 
policy, which facilitates security awareness and offers great support for application secu-
rity monitoring, security measurement, decision making and security status visualization. 
3.1.4 Application Security Monitoring 
Application security monitoring refers to the security surveillance of an application to 
detect any unusual behavior. It involves monitoring a set of metrics that can help to as-
certain whether the application is behaving as desired or whether there has been a case of 
metrics violation that could lead to a threat. Application security monitoring may be 
achieved through the use of security monitoring probes [40] and relevant security librar-
ies. A security monitoring probe is a software program, which monitors different security 
variables (i.e., security metrics) on a network, an application or operating system and then 
transmits the monitored data to a server for further actions. Security monitoring probes 
are installed in the VMs hosting the application components to monitor different sets of 
metrics that helps to establish the status of application properties like availability, perfor-
mance, communication traffic etc. at any time desired. Security libraries may be inte-
grated into the application components to monitor internal events. 
Application security monitoring also extends to the management of all security monitor-
ing probes installed across different VMs. This is important in order to achieve overall 
multi-cloud application security monitoring. The values of the monitored metrics reported 
28 
by each monitoring probe are compiled and stored (i.e., the composite metrics), before 
being sent for further measurement, calculation, evaluation and analysis. The analysis 
may involve the use of machine learning techniques as mentioned in [48], [72]. Applica-
tion security monitoring will ensure that security metrics and relevant security events are 
duly monitored, captured and reported. An approach for monitoring security in multi-
cloud applications is presented in [73]. 
3.1.5 Security Measurement 
The security measurement operation involves the computation of the percentage level of 
fulfillment of each metric (expressed within a range of 0 and 1) based on defined thresh-
olds and the security quotient (i.e., a measure of the level of security) of the multi-cloud 
application. It makes use of specified rules and mathematical formulae to carry out secu-
rity measurements and calculations. Specifically, it applies the rules and formulae on the 
security metrics values reported by the monitoring probes to calculate the security quo-
tient of the multi-cloud application. Security measurement is a combination of security 
objectives [74]. Thus, the security quotient is calculated in terms of the three basic secu-
rity objectives (i.e., confidentiality, integrity and availability) for individual multi-cloud 
application components as well as the overall multi-cloud application based on the request 
for security evaluation. For instance, the security quotient for “availability” of the multi-
cloud application is calculated as the weighted average of all availability security metrics 
i.e., Summation of (all availability metrics (in percentage units))/ number of metrics.) 
3.1.6 Decision making and Security Status Visualization 
The decision-making and security status visualization process is the last step of the secu-
rity evaluation framework. Decision making involves the assessment of the security 
measurements and verdict provision while security status visualization involves display-
ing the security status of the application. In the decision-making process, the security 
measurements are evaluated to ascertain if normal operating conditions have been met or 
if a breach has occurred. Specifically, the measurements are compared with the specified 
thresholds of the metrics and security quotient to determine conformance (desired condi-
tions) or non-conformance (breach or violation). In the case of a breach, decision is taken 
to initiate the process for applying the appropriate security control(s) needed to mitigate 
the threat and restore normalcy. 
Following the evaluation of the security measurements, the result of the evaluation is 
reported. This is called the security status visualization. It involves generating statistics 
and presenting the security status of the multi-cloud application in a user-friendly and 
easy-to-understand manner, specifically using graphs, bar charts, pie charts etc. (i.e., 
GUI). This may be achieved using relevant data visualization JavaScript libraries such as 
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d3.js3 in conjunction with front-end JavaScript frameworks such as Vue.js4. The aim of 
this is to bring about seamless notification and simple presentation of security evaluation 
results (for individual multi-cloud application components and entire application) to the 
end user (application owner, system administrators and IT team). 
3.2 Framework Architectural View 
The architectural view of the proposed security evaluation framework is presented in Fig-
ure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Security evaluation framework architectural view 
3.3 Framework Components 
The main components of the proposed security evaluation framework are request han-
dling engine, security policy engine, security measurement engine, metrics monitoring 
engine, and decision & analytics engine. The description of each component is provided 
in the next sections. 
3.3.1 Request Handling Engine (RHE) 
The request handling engine is the entry port of the security evaluation framework. It is 
the coordinator of the security evaluation system and acts an intermediary for communi-
cation/interactions between other engines. It receives the request to evaluate the security 
of the multi-cloud application and according to the request; it makes a call by forwarding 
the request to the appropriate framework component for processing. Following the pro-
cessing, the response is sent back to the RHE and the RHE sends it to the engine from 
where the request came from or to another engine for further actions as the case may be. 
                                                 
3 https://d3js.org/ 
4 https://vuejs.org/ 
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It continues this process until the final evaluation result has been computed and is now 
ready to be made available to the end-user. 
The RHE (shown in Figure 11) is a software component, which consists of three modules, 
namely Receiver, Directory and Requestor. The Receiver module receives/accepts the 
request sent by the end-user via the user web-interface or other requests coming the other 
components and validates the request by checking the Directory for correctness. The Di-
rectory contains a list of mappings for permissible incoming/outgoing requests in the 
RHE. This makes it possible for the RHE to identify the incoming request, the request 
initiator, the corresponding outgoing request as well as the component required to process 
the request. Following this, the corresponding outgoing request is fetched from the Di-
rectory and sent to the appropriate component by the Requestor. 
 
Figure 11. Request Handling Engine 
For the purpose of illustration, the request for security evaluation would normally begin 
with the RHE communicating with the SPE to extract relevant application details pertain-
ing to the request (e.g., component name, VM details etc.). This is achieved by sending 
SPARQL5 queries from the Requestor to the SPE to extract the required details from the 
SPE. The response provided by the SPE is received by the Receiver and serves as input 
for the next action. An example of a typical query sent to the SPE to retrieve application 
details is shown in Figure 12. 
                                                 
5 https://www.w3.org/TR/sparql11-update/ 
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Figure 12. Sample request sent by Requestor to SPE 
In the above query, the Requestor is sending a query to the SPE to request all assets and 
their VMs. 
3.3.2 Security Policy Engine (SPE) 
The security policy engine provides a means for modelling and specifying the require-
ments of the requirements and information about the application as well as information 
about other engines in the framework. The security policy engine contains information 
about the multi-cloud application (i.e. detailing each component) and all other engines 
making up the security evaluation system. Specifically, it contains information about as-
sets (i.e. application components), cloud service providers, infrastructure type, threats, 
vulnerabilities, organization, metrics, security controls, thresholds, violations etc. The 
SPE is based on the use of ontologies to model the multi-cloud application properties and 
requirements, which are stored in the knowledge base. 
The SPE (shown in Figure 13) consists of four modules, namely Inquirer, Result, Rea-
soner and the Knowledge base (KB). The Inquirer accepts incoming requests (SPARQL 
queries) from the RHE and transmits it to the Reasoner for further actions. The Reasoner 
module is responsible for querying and inferencing. It queries the Knowledge Base (a 
store of security ontology (multi-cloud application security information)) and performs 
inferencing to acquire the query answers, which are presented through the Result module. 
Specifically, the reasoner utilizes forward and backward chaining process [75] for making 
inferences and first-order logic [76] for making deductions based on the facts and axioms 
(i.e., security ontologies) already defined in the Knowledge Base. Through this, the rea-
soner is able to extract new facts from the ontology. 
The flexibility of ontological models makes it easy to update the knowledge base when-
ever required in order to accommodate new changes. In this thesis, the Olingvo tool, 
which is based on OWL is used to develop the required security ontology (security re-
quirements, interactions, concepts, relationships etc.), which represents the security pol-
icy of the security evaluation system. 
32 
 
Figure 13. Security Policy Engine 
3.3.3 Metrics Monitoring Engine (MME) 
The metrics monitoring engine is responsible for the security surveillance management 
of the multi-cloud application. It performs this task to identify any anomaly in the system. 
It manages the activities of all the security monitoring probes (monitoring agents) in-
stalled on the VMs hosting the multi-cloud application components in the CSP environ-
ment. It receives, stores and aggregates the monitored set of metric values reported by the 
different security monitoring probes. The aggregated metric values are then forwarded 
via the RHE to the SME for security measurement. 
The MME (shown in Figure 14) is a software component, which consists of three mod-
ules, namely monitoring server, metrics aggregator and the database. The monitoring 
server manages the operations of all security monitoring probes. It continuously receives 
the security metric values from the monitoring probes and sends them to the database for 
storage. The metric values together with their time stamps are stored in the database for 
the purpose of data logging (i.e., auditing). The metrics aggregator fetches the metric 
values from the database, aggregates them according to the security evaluation request 
and sends them through the RHE to the SME for security measurements and calculations. 
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Figure 14. Metrics Monitoring Engine 
3.3.4 Security Measurement Engine (SME) 
The security measurement engine calculates the percentage level of fulfillment of each 
metric and the security quotient of the multi-cloud application. Through this, the level of 
security in the multi-cloud application is determined. The SME carries out these calcula-
tions using predefined rules and mathematical formulae that are applied on the metric 
values. The security measurements are made according to the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability status of each component of the multi-cloud application. The measure-
ments are also aggregated to derive the overall security measurement of the multi-cloud 
application. The rules and mathematical formulae are updated through the security policy 
engine. This allows for easy modification of the formulae whenever changes are neces-
sary. 
The SME (shown in Figure 15) is a software component, which consists of three modules, 
namely Receiver, Security_calculator and Result. The Receiver module accepts incoming 
requests for security measurements. The request includes the metric values reported by 
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the monitoring probes. The Receiver forwards the request to the Security_calculator, trig-
gering the call for security measurement. The Security_calculator is purely a mathemat-
ical component containing several mathematical rules, functions and formulae for calcu-
lating the security measurement. According to the security measurement request, it in-
vokes the appropriate mathematical formulae and functions required to calculate the per-
centage level of metric fulfillment and the security quotient of the security objective(s). 
The calculation is made for a single component or the entire multi-cloud application com-
ponent according to the request. Following this calculation, the Result module retrieves 
the security measurement results for onward transmission to the RHE for further actions. 
 
Figure 15. Security Measurement Engine 
The mathematical formulae for making the different security measurements are presented 
below. First, the mathematical notations are defined; 
𝐿 = 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝑚 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
𝑛 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑠 
𝑛𝑎 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑠 
𝑛𝑐 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑠 
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𝑛𝑖 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑠 
𝑆 = 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
𝑆𝑄𝑜 = 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝑆𝑄𝑎 = 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝑆𝑄𝑐 = 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝑆𝑄𝑖 = 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 
Then followed by the actual mathematical formulae; 
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3.3.5 Decision & Analytics Engine (DAE) 
The decision & analytics engine handles decision-making and presentation of the security 
status of the multi-cloud application to the end-user. It receives the results of the security 
measurement performed by the SME and evaluates it based on predefined threshold val-
ues to establish a state of normalcy or violation, after which appropriate actions are taken. 
It also displays the results of the security evaluation exercise in the end-user device in an 
easily comprehensible way using graphs, bar charts and pie charts etc. Through this, the 
end-user becomes aware of the internal operations and performance of the multi-cloud 
application. 
The DAE (shown in Figure 16) is a software component, which consists of three modules, 
namely Receptor, Decision and Visualizer. The Receptor module retrieves the results of 
the security measurements from the SME and initiates the decision-making process by 
forwarding the results to the Decision module. The Decision module is a comparator and 
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enforcement module. It receives the security measurement results and compares them 
with the specified thresholds of metrics and security quotient to determine if they are 
within/beyond the acceptable limits. This helps to estimate the security status of the multi-
cloud application. In the event of a violation of the thresholds, the Decision module de-
cides on the appropriate security control(s) and initiates the process for enforcing it to 
mitigate the anomaly and restore normalcy. Following this, the Visualizer presents the 
security status of the multi-cloud application. The Visualizer is basically a web interface 
through which the result of the security evaluation exercise i.e., the security status is pre-
sented to the end-user. The Visualizer also allows the end-user to interact with the security 
evaluation framework. 
 
Figure 16. Decision & Analytics Engine 
In this section, the security evaluation framework components have been described. The 
combination of all the framework components results in the final security evaluation 
framework, which is presented in Figure 17. It receives security evaluation request as 
input and provides security evaluation results as its output. 
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Figure 17. Final security evaluation framework 
The security evaluation request is received by the RHE, which interacts with other en-
gines to process the request until the evaluation results are provided are by the DAE. The 
processing of the request involves several interactions between the framework engines. 
The sequence diagram shown in Figure 18 presents these interactions. 
 
Figure 18. Interactions between engines following a request for security evaluation 
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4. IMPLEMENTATION 
In the previous section, the methodology for performing security evaluation was pre-
sented. In this section, the methodology is validated using the TSM application as a case 
study. The TSM application [52] is “a smart mobility multi-cloud application that pro-
vides an energy efficient and smart mobility solution to Tampere (Finland) citizens”. It 
makes available personalized journey suggestions from which the application users can 
make their selections. It stores users’ personal data, activity and mobility profiles on the 
cloud and thus requires adequate protection to prevent breaches and abuses. The archi-
tecture of the TSM application is shown in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19. TSM Application architecture 
The focus in this implementation will be on threat identification, risk analysis, selection 
of security metrics, selection of security controls and application modelling. 
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4.1 Threat Identification and Risk Analysis 
Threat identification and risk analysis begins with the decomposition of the TSM appli-
cation. This involves splitting the application into the constituents that makes up the ap-
plication. This is essential as it helps to identify the application components and under-
stand their nature, operation and interactions with external entities. Specifically, applica-
tion decomposition involves identification of assets, entry points and trust levels. The 
assets represent the application components, which are the attack targets and thus need to 
be safeguarded. Entry points are the interfaces through which the components communi-
cate with external entities while the trust levels represent the access rights granted to ex-
ternal entities by the application. Application decomposition is the first step towards iden-
tifying potential threat targets. The result of the application decomposition exercise for 
the TSM application is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Application decomposition for the TSM application 
S/N Asset (Component) Description Trust Level Entry Point 
1 TSM Engine (TSMe) TSM application aggrega-
tor and request handler 
Administrator Web server 
App users HTTP port 
2 Multimodal Journey 
Planner (MJP) 
A web application that pro-
vides journey options 
TSM components HTTP Port 
3 Consumption Estimator 
Calculator (CEC) 
A web application that cal-
culates energy consump-
tion based on journey op-
tion 
TSM components HTTP Port 
4 Database (DB) A component that stores 
users’ personal data and ac-
tivity logs  
TSM components HTTP Port 
The application decomposition exercise shows that the TSM application is made up of 
four major components. Apart from the Database, which is a storage component, all the 
other components are web applications. 
4.1.1 Threat Identification 
Following the decomposition of the TSM application is the identification of threats using 
the threat modelling technique recommended by OWASP [20]. The aim is to identify the 
threats that are most likely to impact the TSM application, particularly by analyzing the 
application bearing in mind the potential attacker’s intention. It involves classifying the 
threats using the STRIDE methodology. The likely threats particular to each TSM appli-
cation component are identified. The threats have been identified according to the nature 
and functionality of the TSM application components. Specifically, as the TSM applica-
tion consists of web applications and storage components hosted in cloud environments, 
threats that affect web applications, storage components and cloud applications have been 
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identified using several web application security, storage and cloud security threat cata-
logues as presented in [77]–[81]. The threats most likely to affect each of the TSM appli-
cation components are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Identified threats for TSM components 
Cat. TSMe MJP CEC Database 
S Broken authentication 
Sensitive data disclo-
sure 
Man in the middle Man in the middle Man-in-the-middle 
Sensitive data disclo-
sure 
T Injection flaws 
Cross site scripting 
(XSS) 
Injection flaws Injection flaws Modifying metadata 
Injection flaws 
R Overly permissive 
cross-domain whitelist 
 Overly permissive cross-
domain whitelist 
 
I Access token leaks 
Insecure direct object 
reference  
Obtain access tokens 
 
Obtain access tokens 
Insecure direct object 
reference 
Weak identity, cre-
dential & access man-
agement 
Obtain access tokens  
Weak identity, credential 
& access management 
 
Data breaches 
Sniffing storage traffic 
D DoS 
DDoS 
DoS 
DDoS 
DoS DoS 
Deletion of data 
E Unauthorized access to 
admin interface 
Over privileged appli-
cations and accounts 
Account hijacking 
 
 Unauthorized access to 
admin interface 
Over privileged applica-
tions and accounts 
Unauthorized access to 
admin interface 
Over privileged appli-
cations and accounts 
Resource owner imper-
sonation 
Account hijacking 
In Table 2, the threats likely to affect each component have been presented according to 
the STRIDE categories. This ensures easy understanding of the nature of the threats as 
well as the intention of a potential attacker and likely effect of each threat following an 
attack. A detailed description of all the threats listed above is provided in Appendix A. 
4.1.2 Risk Analysis 
Following the identification and categorization of threats using the STRIDE methodol-
ogy, the process continues with risk assessment i.e., the evaluation and ranking of the risk 
related to the threats to estimate the degree of potential harm and determine the most 
critical components in the TSM application. The risk is analyzed based on threat catego-
ries (i.e., using STRIDE categorization), thereby giving a general overview of the risk 
based on the threat category. For instance, the spoofing risk in an application component 
represents the risk associated with all the spoofing threats identified in that component. 
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The risk is computed using a qualitative risk model i.e., (Risk = Probability x Impact). 
The probability refers to the likelihood of the threat while the impact is the extent of 
damage resulting from the threat. Figure 20 shows the outcome of the risk analysis pro-
cess. 
 
Figure 20. TSM Application risk assessment 
In Figure 20, for each threat category and each component, the threat likelihood value is 
on the left, the level of impact of the threat is on the right while the computed risk is 
below the two values. The sum of all the calculated risks is presented at the bottom of the 
table. The database component has the highest risk while the multimodal journey planner 
has the lowest risk. This is quite understandable owing to the type of information that 
these components handle. The database stores sensitive and personal data of the applica-
tion users and hence possesses a higher risk as it becomes a big target for potential attack-
ers. The multimodal journey planner does not store any sensitive information and thus is 
of less interest to attackers. In conclusion, the risk analysis exercise shows that the TSM 
engine and the Database are the most critical components of the TSM application and 
thus must be adequately guarded. All the components of the TSM application must be 
protected to avoid any security ‘loophole’ through the application can be attacked. In the 
next section, the appropriate security controls are selected and presented. 
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4.2 Selection of Security Metrics and Security Controls 
In this section, the relevant security metrics and security controls for the TSM application 
are selected. This is important because it helps to identify monitorable parameters for 
threat detection as well as adequate countermeasures to mitigate identified threats and 
restore normalcy. These selections are made using relevant security metrics and security 
controls standards and frameworks. The selected security metrics and security controls 
for the TSM application components are presented in the next section. 
4.2.1 Selection of Security Metrics 
Security metrics are selected according to the interest of the application owner, which is 
enshrined in the security objectives of the application (primarily confidentiality, integrity 
and availability). In addition, the metrics are also selected such that they can be used to 
monitor different application behaviors that could lead to the detection and identification 
of threats, particularly when their thresholds become violated. In this thesis, the basic 
security objectives were considered and relevant sources of security metrics [53]–[55], 
[82], [83] were consulted to select the security metrics for the TSM application. The initial 
analysis leading to the selection of the metrics for the TSM application began with the 
declaration of the security objectives. The Fishbone diagram presented in Figure 21 ade-
quately captures this. 
 
Figure 21. TSM Application security objectives 
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In the diagram above, the interest of the application owner is duly expressed according to 
the security objectives. The different sub-factors emanating from the core objectives (i.e., 
integrity, confidentiality and availability) represents the activities that are of monitorable 
or measurable interest, and based on this and in conjunction with the identified threats, 
the appropriate metrics are selected. For instance, for an availability sub-factor such as 
redundancy and an availability threat such as Denial of Service (DoS), a metric such as 
level of redundancy is selected to measure the capability of the application to handle 
multiple and concurrent requests before it becomes unavailable. The higher the level of 
redundancy, the more available the system is expected to be. The security metrics selected 
for the TSM application are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Selected security metrics for TSM application according to identified threats 
Identified threats Selected Security metrics Specified Thresholds 
Broken authentication Identity assurance Level ≥ 3 
Sensitive data disclosure HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) Yes 
TLS cryptographic strength  7 
Data encryption Yes 
Level of confidentiality 4 
Man in the middle (MiTM) Identity assurance Level ≥ 3 
HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) Yes 
TLS cryptographic strength 7 
Data encryption Yes 
Level of confidentiality 4 
Injection flaws Log unalterability 2 
SQL Injection No 
Cross site scripting (XSS) Identity assurance Level ≥ 3 
Level of confidentiality 4 
Vulnerability measure 100% 
Modifying metadata Log unalterability 2 
Overly permissive cross-domain 
whitelist 
Identity assurance Level ≥ 3 
Access token leaks HTTP to HTTPS redirects Yes 
Data encryption Yes 
Insecure direct object reference Identity assurance Level ≥ 3 
Access control and enforcement Failed attempts <3 
Obtain access tokens Data encryption Yes 
Identity assurance Level ≥ 3 
Weak Identity, credentials & ac-
cess management 
Identity assurance Level ≥ 3 
Access control and enforcement Failed attempts <3 
Data encryption Yes 
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Data breaches HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) Yes 
TLS cryptographic strength  7 
Data encryption Yes 
Level of confidentiality 4 
Sniffing storage traffic HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) Yes 
TLS cryptographic strength  7 
Denial of Service (DoS) &  
Distributed Denial of Service 
(DoS)  
Level of redundancy 3 
Service availability ≥ 99.99% 
Deletion of data Level of redundancy 3 
Unauthorized access to admin 
interface 
Over privileged applications and 
accounts 
Identity assurance Level ≥ 3 
Access control and enforcement Failed attempts <3 
Account hijacking 
Resource owner impersonation 
Identity assurance Level ≥ 3 
Access control and enforcement Failed attempts <3 
Personnel security screening measure 100% 
In Table 3, the set(s) of security metrics required for monitoring the different identified 
TSM application threats is presented. In addition, thresholds have been specified for each 
metric. A violation of the specified metric threshold results in a threat. A detailed infor-
mation about each of the selected metrics is provided in Appendix B. 
4.2.2 Selection of Security Controls 
Security controls are essential to mitigate threats. According to the threats identified in 
the TSM application, sufficient security controls have been selected to combat them. 
These controls have been selected using the Cloud Control Matrix (CCM) [57] and NIST 
SP 800-53 Rev. 4 [56] security control frameworks. The selected controls are aligned 
with the threat categories and identified threats for each component. Specifically, for each 
threat, the required security control property is identified using the OWASP methodology 
[36] and then based on this, the security control domain (i.e., control group) is identified 
and security control is selected. The security control domain is identified using the CCM 
standard and for each security control domain, several security controls have been rec-
ommended, out of which the most appropriate security control(s) needed to mitigate the 
threat is then selected. Additional NIST security controls may also be selected based on 
the peculiarity of each threat. The selected security controls are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4. Selected security controls for TSM application threats 
Identified threats Recommended secu-
rity control property 
(OWASP) [36] 
Security control do-
main (CCM) [57] 
Selected security 
control (NIST) [56] 
Broken authentication Strong authentication IAM-12 IA-5 
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Sensitive data disclosure Protection of secret data EKM-03 SC-8(1), SC-13, SC-
23 
Cross site scripting 
(XSS) 
Message integrity pro-
tocols 
EKM-03 SC-8 
Injection flaws Message integrity pro-
tocols 
AIS-03 & AIS-04 SI-10 
Overly permissive 
cross-domain whitelist 
  SA-13 
Insecure direct object 
reference 
Strong authorization IAM-09 AC-3, AC-6 
Access token leaks Message confidentiality 
protocols 
EKM-03 SC-8 
Obtain access tokens Don’t store secrets EKM-04 SC-12 
Denial of Service (DoS)  IVS-13 SC-5 
Distributed Denial of 
Service (DoS) 
 IVS-13 SC-5(3) 
Unauthorized access to 
admin interface 
Use least privileges IAM-05 AC-5, AC-6 
Over privileged applica-
tions and accounts 
Use least privileges IAM-05 AC-5, AC-6 
Account hijacking Use least privileges IAM-09 AC-5, AC-6 
Weak identity, creden-
tial & access manage-
ment 
Strong encryption EKM-03 AC-2, SC-13 
Man-in-the-middle 
(MiTM) 
Strong authentication IAM-12 IA-5, SC-23 
Modifying metadata Tamper-resistant proto-
cols 
IAM-01 SA-18 
Data breaches Message confidentiality 
protocols 
EKM-03 AC-2, SC-13 
Sniffing storage traffic Message confidentiality 
protocols 
EKM-03 SC-8 
Deletion of data  IVS-13 CP-9(6) 
Resource owner imper-
sonation 
 IAM-09 AC-2, IA-2(13) 
Table 4 shows the security controls required for the mitigation of the TSM application 
identified threats. The recommendation provided by OWASP and the classification ma-
trix given by CSA (i.e., CCM),  has made it seamless to identify and select sufficient 
security controls needed to counter the identified threats likely to affect the TSM appli-
cation. A detailed explanation of the security controls domain and the selected security 
controls is provided in Appendix C and Appendix D respectively. 
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4.3 Application Modelling 
Application modelling is an important step required for developing and formulating the 
security policy, which is the lifeline of the security policy engine. In this section, the TSM 
application model is presented. The model has been developed using the Ontology Web 
Language (OWL) and it represents the security knowledge of the application, detailing 
application requirements (components, VMs, CSP information etc.), security require-
ments, meta-information, dependencies and interactions in the form of classes such as 
asset, threat, security control, properties such as ownsAsset, hasThreat, hasAttack-
Goal, constraints and several instances. The specific details of the classes and properties 
are presented in the next section. 
4.3.1 Classes 
The TSM application model (i.e., security policy ontology) consists of 24 classes, which 
includes asset, threat, threshold etc. The classes were defined based on the security re-
quirements of the TSM application, thereby ensuring that the security knowledge of TSM 
application is adequately represented. Some of the classes have sub-classes, which help 
to provide more information and description about the parent classes. In addition, there 
are also instances defined, which represents class membership. For instance, the ‘Threat’ 
class consists of six sub-classes, namely ‘denial of service’, ‘elevation of privileges’, ‘in-
formation disclosure’, ‘repudiation’, ‘spoofing’ and ‘tampering’ with several instances. 
For example, deletion of data threat is an instance of the denial of service class and its 
basic ontology is presented in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22. Ontology of the 'deletion of data' threat 
The details of all the classes in the TSM application model are presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Details of all classes in the TSM application model 
S/N Classes Description 
1 Asset An entity of great value belonging to an organization. It is also an at-
tack target e.g., a database 
2 Attack Goal The intention behind perpetuating an attack e.g., to steal data 
3 Attack Mechanism The mode of perpetuating an attack e.g., brute force  
4 Cloud Service Provider 
(CSP) 
An organization that offers storage or software services through the 
cloud e.g., AWS 
5 Communication Port A physical or virtual interface for communication e.g., serial port 
6 Deployment Model A type of cloud environment e.g., public cloud 
7 Entry Point An interface through which an application component communicates 
with external entities e.g., HTTP port 
8 Geographical Location A physical location or region on the earth surface e.g., Africa 
9 Hardware Requirement The physical computer resources required by a software or operating 
system e.g., RAM 
10 Operating System A software platform that aids a computer’s basic functions e.g., Ub-
untu 
11 Organization An establishment, company or firm e.g., Tampere University of Tech-
nology 
12 Risk Level The level of criticality of a threat e.g., High 
13 Security Monitoring 
Probe 
A software program that monitors different security variables on a net-
work, an application or operating system 
14 Security Control A countermeasure required for mitigating a threat e.g., access control 
15 Security Control Mech-
anism 
A technique for applying a security control e.g., use of certificates 
16 Security Control Prop-
erty 
A required attribute of a security control e.g., strong authentication 
17 Security Controls Do-
main 
The security group to which a security control belongs e.g., encryption 
and key management 
18 Security Metrics A set of parameters for monitoring application performance, charac-
teristics or behaviors e.g., level of redundancy 
19 Security Objectives The fundamental goals of security e.g., confidentiality 
20 Service Model A framework for providing cloud computing services e.g., PaaS 
21 Threat Anything that can cause harm to an asset or that can lead to an attack 
e.g., denial of service (DoS) 
22 Threshold A limit which when exceeded, indicates the likelihood of a threat 
23 Trust Level The access rights granted to external entities by an application e.g., 
admin 
24 Virtual Machine (VM) A software computer with an operating system 
In Table 5, the description of each of the defined class for the TSM application model is 
given. This helps to provide a clear understanding of the classes as we as the major com-
ponents of the TSM application model. 
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4.3.2 Properties 
Following the definition of classes is the definition of properties. In the TSM application 
model, there are 21 properties, which describes the relationship between different classes. 
The properties were defined based on the classes and mainly represents the associations 
between them. For instance, the ‘ownsAsset’ property describes the binary relationship 
between the ‘Organization’ and ‘Asset’ classes. Organization is the domain while Asset 
represents the range. This simply means that Assets are owned by Organizations. Figure 
23 shows all the properties in the TSM application model as defined on the Olingvo tool. 
 
Figure 23. TSM Application model properties 
The details of all the properties in the TSM application model are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6. Details of all properties in the TSM application model 
S/N Properties Description 
1 belongsToSecurityDomain An object property that associates security controls with security 
controls domain 
2 hasAttackGoal An object property that associates threats with attack goals 
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3 hasAttackMechanism An object property that associates threats with attack mechanisms 
4 hasCommPort An object property that associates assets with communication 
port 
5 hasControlMechanism An object property that associates security controls with security 
control mechanisms 
6 hasDeploymentModel An object property that associates CSPs with cloud deployment 
models 
7 hasEntryPoint An object property that associates assets with entry point 
8 hasHWReq An object property that associates virtual machines with hard-
ware requirements 
9 hasLocation An object property that associates CSPs with geographical loca-
tion 
10 hasOS An object property that associates virtual machines with operat-
ing system 
11 hasSecurityMonitor-
ingProbe 
An object property that associates assets with security monitoring 
probes 
12 hasThreat An object property that associates assets with threats 
13 hasThreshold An object property that associates security metrics with threshold 
14 hasTrustLevel An object property that associates assets with trust levels 
15 hostsVM An object property that associates CSPs with virtual machines 
16 isMitigatedBy An object property that associates threats with security controls 
17 isMonitoredThrough An object property that associates threats with security metrics 
18 ownsAsset An object property that associates organization with assets 
19 requiresSecurityCon-
trolProperty 
An object property that associates threats with security control 
property 
20 residesOnVM An object property that associates assets with virtual machines 
21 runsOn An object property that associates security monitoring probes 
with virtual machines 
Table 6 shows the relationship that exists between different classes of the TSM applica-
tion model. It clearly indicates the properties that bind different classes together. A sum-
mary of all the classes, properties and instances that make up the TSM application model 
is presented in Table 7. 
Table 7. A summary of classes, properties and instances in the TSM application model 
S/N Properties  
1 Number of Classes 24 
2 Number of Properties 21 
3 Number of Individuals (Instances) 200 
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5. RESULTS 
This section presents the results of the framework operations carried out in Chapter 4. It 
covers threat identification, risk analysis, selection of security metrics, selection of secu-
rity controls and application modelling. The threat modelling exercise brought about the 
identification of 20 different threats (Table 2) that are likely to affect the TSM application, 
with the TSM engine and database components having the most number of threats, out of 
which injection flaws and denial of service (DoS) threats were the most significant 
threats. The risk analysis process also revealed the TSM engine and database components 
as having the highest risk levels amongst all the TSM application components. These 
results have showed that the TSM engine and the database components are the most crit-
ical components of the TSM application. This is largely attributed to the sensitive nature 
of the data and information processed by the two components. 
A total number of 13 security metrics with specified thresholds (Table 3) and 18 security 
controls (Table 4) were selected to monitor the threats levels and mitigate the threats re-
spectively. Other relevant properties such as organization, CSP information and commu-
nication ports were defined to completely specify and describe the security and applica-
tion requirements of the TSM application. The specification of these properties resulted 
in the development of the TSM application model, which represents the security 
knowledge of the multi-cloud environment. In Appendix E, a snippet of the TSM appli-
cation ontology is presented. The development of the TSM application model is an inte-
gral part of the steps required to achieve transparency and security awareness. It is a fun-
damental aspect of the security evaluation framework upon which all other engines de-
pend. Without it, the engines cannot carry out their functions, security evaluation cannot 
be achieved, and thus transparency and security awareness becomes impossible. 
The Olingvo tool developed by the FAST-Lab was utilized in formulating the TSM ap-
plication model. The significant aspects of the TSM application model are the applica-
tion/security requirements represented as ‘classes’, the interactions between them repre-
sented as ‘properties’ and the application/security requirements types represented as ‘in-
stances’. These different aspects of the TSM application model are shown in Figure 24, 
Figure 25 and Figure 26. 
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Figure 24. TSM Application model (showing classes) 
Figure 24 presents all the TSM application model classes. They represent the major as-
pects of the TSM application required for describing the security requirements of the TSM 
application. 
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Figure 25. TSM Application model (showing properties) 
In Figure 25, the most relevant properties of the TSM application model are shown. They 
represent the associations or relationships that exists between different classes and help 
in understanding how they interact with one another. 
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Figure 26. TSM Application model (showing instances of the CSP class) 
Figure 26 shows the defined instances of the CSP class of the TSM application model. 
They represent the declarations or examples of CSPs e.g., Google cloud. In addition to 
the different aspects of the TSM application model that has been presented, a typical 
query for retrieving information from the application model is shown in Figure 27, where 
the response is also captured. 
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Figure 27. A sample query/response from the TSM application model 
In Figure 27, a query is sent to retrieve all components that are affected by ‘sensitive data 
disclosure’ threat. The response to the query reveals that the Database (DB) and TSM 
engine (TSMe) are the components affected by the threat. 
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6. DISCUSSIONS 
The heterogeneous nature of multi-cloud environments introduces dynamism within the 
environment particularly regarding the health and security status of the components and 
applications hosted in the environment and thereby requires adequate security awareness 
and transparency within the environment. Security awareness and transparency will en-
sure that the application/component security status as well as internal events and interac-
tions within the environment can be determined in real time. To achieve this, a security 
evaluation framework was proposed in this thesis. This is to enable the security assess-
ment of the multi-cloud environment, thereby revealing the security status of the environ-
ment and its components at any time required. 
The proposed security evaluation framework consists of five engines; 
 Request handling engine 
 Security policy engine 
 Metrics monitoring engine 
 Security measurement engine 
 Decision & analytics engine 
They all work collaboratively to bring about transparency and security awareness. The 
procedures for evaluating security in multi-clouds have been outlined in this thesis 
through the different operations provided by the different engines. To demonstrate these 
procedures, the TSM application was used a case study with focus on threat identification, 
risk analysis, security metrics, security controls and application modelling, which is pro-
vided by the security policy engine (SPE). In this thesis, the application modelling oper-
ation was explored, as all other engines rely on the application model for their operations. 
In identifying the threats, the peculiar nature and operation of the TSM application com-
ponents were studied and likely threats were selected using relevant threat catalogues. 
The threat catalogues provided an opportunity to easily identify and select the threats that 
could affect the TSM application components. In particular, threats relating to storage 
and web applications were selected owing to the nature of the TSM application compo-
nents. As regards risk analysis, the threats were categorized based on STRIDE, thus mak-
ing it possible to recognize and understand the nature of each threat before calculating the 
risks according to the threat categories. The risk calculations showed that the database 
and TSM engine are the most critical components, clearly pointing out that these compo-
nents are the most likely to be attacked. 
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In determining the security metrics, the selection of security metrics leveraged on several 
metrics defined and proposed by reputable standards organization such as NIST and rel-
evant EU funded research projects such as A4Cloud6, SPECS7 and MUSA8. In particular, 
the choice of selecting and using metrics defined by these projects was based on the fact 
that they were cloud and multi-cloud related projects. For the security controls, the secu-
rity evaluation framework relied on NVD database (i.e., NIST security controls) and 
CCM for the selection of security controls. These controls have been known to be ade-
quate to provide necessary countermeasure to mitigate threats as they have been exten-
sively referenced in many literatures and research projects. 
The operations mentioned in the aforementioned paragraphs culminated in the develop-
ment of the TSM application model, which represents the foundation of the security eval-
uation framework. The TSM application model was developed using ontology. Ontology 
is machine-readable, inductive, and reusable and brings about the development of domain 
knowledge, hence its choice to development of the TSM application model. Specifically 
by using ontology, the security domain knowledge of the TSM application has been de-
veloped and it provides an opportunity to update and extend the KB in order to accom-
modate the complexity of the multi-cloud environment. The ability to capture the com-
plexities make ontology suitable for application modelling. 
The TSM application model (security ontology) is robust as it consists of 24 classes, 21 
properties and 200 instances. This is as a result of the extensive description of the TSM 
application to accommodate the appropriate application and security requirements, to-
gether with their relationships. The model can also be extended to encapsulate the dy-
namics within the multi-cloud environment. The TSM application model serves as a base 
for the operations of the other engines in the framework. Through these engines, the 
framework will ensure security monitoring of all application components and the entire 
multi-cloud environment, detection of threats and unusual behaviors, mitigation of 
threats, reporting of security status and restoration of normal operating conditions within 
the multi-cloud environment. 
The realization of the aforementioned framework operations will lead to security aware-
ness and transparency in the multi-cloud environment as users and application owners 
become more knowledgeable about the operation, execution and most importantly the 
security status of their applications. The main benefits attached to this are that multi-cloud 
users will have control over their assets, security management becomes seamless for 
CSPs and cloud customers’ trust and confidence in using multiple cloud resources in-
creases. 
                                                 
6 http://cloudaccountability.eu 
7 http://www.specs-project.eu/ 
8 https://www.musa-project.eu/ 
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7. CONCLUSION 
Multi-cloud adoption continues to grow owing to its benefits. On the contrary, its level 
of complexity continues to increase owing to its heterogeneous and open nature, which 
increases its attack surface and introduces various threats and vulnerabilities. This has 
clearly made security a major issue to ponder about deeply and has affected the trust and 
confidence of cloud customers. It has led to the difficulty of establishing the security 
status of application components hosted in multiple clouds and has given rise to the need 
for transparency and security awareness in multi-cloud environments. Therefore, it is re-
quired to design and implement an approach for managing security management in multi-
cloud environments. It is in view of this that this thesis has been conducted. 
Transparency and security awareness are required in multi-cloud environments to enable 
application owners determine the security status of their application as well as the entire 
multi-cloud environment, and to verify that CSPs are granting the SLA. In this thesis, a 
security evaluation framework has been proposed. In addition, the procedures for actual-
izing transparency and security awareness through security evaluation have been clearly 
explained. The framework has brought about the identification of threats, estimation of 
risk, identification of the most critical application components, development of applica-
tion model, selection of security metrics and security controls. Although a major issue 
might be the ability of the desired CSP to grant the required security control as it is pos-
sible that not all CSPs may grant the security controls. 
The framework involves application modelling, application security monitoring, security 
measurement, decision making and security status visualization. In this thesis, major em-
phasis has been placed on application modelling. The application modelling exercise gave 
rise to the application model, which is an organic aspect of the framework. Ontology 
played a major role in the model development as different security concepts, relationships 
and mechanisms were defined and specified in the ontology, to adequately represent the 
application and security requirements. With this, the security ontology of the TSM appli-
cation was actualized. While the Security Policy Engine (SPE) offers the application 
modelling functionality, the operations of all the other engines as well as the procedures 
for realizing them have been explained in this thesis. 
The proposed security evaluation framework addresses the problem statements of this 
thesis, which relates to security evaluation, transparency and security awareness in multi-
cloud environments as the framework methodology (Chapter 3) clearly explains how this 
may be achieved. The framework has been partially implemented as mentioned earlier, 
with efforts concentrated on the application modelling aspect, the most significant aspect 
of the framework. However, it is expected that the implementation of the entire security 
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evaluation framework will bring forth the realization of transparency and security aware-
ness in the multi-cloud environment. Specifically, the proposed framework will offer; 
 Evaluation of multi-cloud environment security and the presentation of evaluation 
results to the end users. 
 Multi-cloud environment transparency and security awareness of multi-cloud ap-
plication components. 
The major area of improvement in the framework is the complete implementation of all 
the engines i.e., security policy, metrics monitoring, security measurement, and decision 
& analytics engines. This will ensure that security in multi-cloud environments can be 
promptly analyzed and assessed, and transparency and security awareness can be 
achieved through adequate security evaluation. 
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF IDENTIFIED THREATS 
This appendix presents a detailed description of the identified threats that are likely to 
affect the TSM application as presented in Table 2. 
S/N Threat Category Threats Description 
1 Spoofing Broken authenti-
cation [79] 
A situation where authentication is not properly imple-
mented, thus giving attackers the opportunity to com-
promise passwords, keys, tokens etc. to assume valid 
users’ status  
Sensitive data dis-
closure [79] 
The careless exposure of sensitive information at rest 
or in transit, usually due to the data not being en-
crypted 
Man-in-the-mid-
dle [84] 
This involve intercepting the communication between 
two endpoints and altering the messages being sent  
2 Tampering Injection flaws 
[79] 
This flaw involves additional and untrusted data is in-
serted and sent as part of a query. The intention is to 
modify the request 
Cross site script-
ing (XSS) [79] 
A flaw that occurs when untrusted data is sent to a 
browser without validation. The intention is to hijack 
sessions and perform malicious activities. 
Modifying 
metadata [81] 
This involves changing metadata in order to disrupt a 
storage system 
3 Repudiation Overly permissive 
cross-domain 
whitelist [80] 
This occurs when a software component makes of a 
cross-domain policy that contains untrusted domains 
4 Information Dis-
closure 
Access token 
leaks [85] 
This occurs when tokens are eavesdropped by an at-
tacker during transmission. It occurs when the com-
munication is not secure. 
Insecure direct ob-
ject reference [78] 
This occurs when a reference to an internal implemen-
tation object e.g., database key is exposed. 
Obtain access to-
kens [85] 
This occurs when tokens are stolen from a client and 
used by an attacker for malicious actions 
Weak identity, 
credential & ac-
cess management 
[77] 
The use of poor authentication systems or weak pass-
words, which leads to information disclosure 
Data breaches 
[77] 
A situation where sensitive data or information is 
viewed or processed without authorization  
Sniffing storage 
traffic [81] 
This involves monitoring storage service traffic in or-
der to steal data 
5 Denial of Service Denial of Service 
(DoS) [77] 
This is aimed at making a resource unavailable for 
valid users. It may carried through disruption or re-
source overloading  
Distributed Denial 
of Service (DDoS) 
[77] 
This is aimed at making a resource unavailable for 
valid users. It may carried through disruption or re-
source overloading 
Deletion of data 
[81] 
This involves deliberate erasure of data in order to 
make data unavailable to the users 
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6 Elevation of Privi-
leges 
Unauthorized ac-
cess to admin in-
terface [86] 
This involves gaining access to the admin interface 
without authorization 
Over privileged 
applications and 
accounts [87] 
The use of a privileged program to obtain access to an 
application or account without authorization 
Account hijacking 
[77] 
This involves stealing or taking over a user’s account 
details for malicious intentions and actions 
Resource owner 
impersonation 
[85] 
This involves illegally obtaining a user’s credentials 
and gains authorization without the consent of the user 
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APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTION OF SELECTED SECURITY MET-
RICS 
This appendix presents a comprehensive description of the security metrics as proposed 
in  [82], [83], [88]. The metrics have been selected to monitor the identified threats in the 
TSM application. In addition, the range over which the metrics is specified is listed. 
S/N Selected Security 
metrics 
Description Range 
1 Access control and 
enforcement 
This metric represents the number of valid access at-
tempts, failed access attempts, access retries and also fre-
quency of password change attempts 
Integer > 0 
2 Data encryption This metrics checks if the data being transmitted/stored in 
cloud storage is encrypted and not in plain text  
Yes/No 
3 HSTS (HTTP Strict 
Transport Security) 
This metric requires that the resource be transported or 
make available over a secure HTTP connection 
Yes/No 
4 HTTP to HTTPS re-
directs 
This metric requires that clients use only secure HTTP 
protocol for service delivery 
Yes/No 
5 Identity assurance  This metrics specifies the quality of the authentication 
mechanisms 
Level 0: No authentication mechanisms are in place 
Level 1: Simple challenge response mechanisms are al-
lowed and no identity proofing is required 
Level 2: Single factor remote network authentication is re-
quired; in this case, authentication is successful if the 
claimant proves control of the authentication token 
through a secure authentication protocol 
Level 3: Multifactor authentication mechanisms are in 
place. Proofs of control of the authentication token are 
done through a cryptographic protocol 
Level 4: Multifactor authentication with a hardware cryp-
tographic token is required. Strong cryptographic mecha-
nisms are required along physical tokens with a FIPS 140-
2 level greater than 2, and identity proofing is done in per-
son 
0 ≤ integer ≤ 
4 
6 Level of confidenti-
ality 
This metric specifies the confidentiality level of a system. 
It involves 4 levels; 
Level 0: Data may be accessible by the cloud provider per-
sonnel for regular operational purposes, under the control 
of an authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) 
mechanism 
Level 1: Data is accessible via AAA mechanism 
Level 2: Technical and organizational measures are in 
place so that data may only be accessible to privileged 
CSP personnel (administrators) for debugging or mainte-
nance purposes, under the control of an AAA mechanism 
Level 3: Technical and organizational measures are in 
place so that data is only accessible to privileged CSP per-
0 ≤ integer ≤ 
4 
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sonnel to respond to law enforcement or extraordinary re-
quests made by the client, under the control of an AAA 
mechanism. 
Level 4: Data is encrypted by the client with cryptographic 
keys that cannot be ascertained by the provider. 
7 Level of redun-
dancy 
This metric specifies the number of replicas of a software 
component set up during system operation  
Integer > 0 
8 Log unalterability This metric specifies the protection level of the log man-
agement system against tampering. 
Level 0: No integrity mechanisms are in place  
Level 1: Log integrity is protected only by access control 
measures 
Level 2: Cryptographic mechanisms are in place for guar-
anteeing log unalterability or WORM (Write Once Read 
Many) devices are used. 
0 ≤ integer ≤ 
2 
9 Personnel security 
screening measure 
This metrics measures the percentage of individuals 
screened before being granted access to organizational in-
formation and information systems 
0 ≤ integer ≤ 
100 
10 Service availability The percentage amount of time that the service is availa-
ble to users 
0 ≤ integer ≤ 
100 
11 SQL Injection This metric monitors the queries to identify any SQL in-
jection attempts 
Yes/No 
12 TLS cryptographic 
strength  
This metric measures the strength of the cryptosystem. 
The values (level 1-8) are based on ECRYPT recommen-
dation 2012: https://www.keylength.com/en/3/. The de-
fault level is 7 
Level 1: Attacks in "real-time" by individuals. Only ac-
ceptable for authentication tag size. 
Level 2: Very short-term protection against small organi-
zations. Should not be used for confidentiality in new sys-
tems. 
Level 3: Short-term protection against medium organiza-
tions, medium-term protection against small organizations 
Level 4: Very short-term protection against agencies, 
long-term protection against small organizations 
Level 5: Legacy standard level 
Level 6: Medium-term protection 
Level 7: Long-term protection 
Level 8: “Foreseeable future” 
1 ≤ integer ≤ 
8 
13 Vulnerability meas-
ure 
It measures the efficiency in percentage (%) of high  vul-
nerabilities mitigated within organizationally defined time 
periods after discovery 
Strategic Goal: Ensure an environment of comprehensive 
security and accountability for personnel, facilities, and 
products. Information Security Goal: Ensure all vulnera-
bilities are identified and mitigated. 
0 ≤ integer ≤ 
100 
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APPENDIX C: DESCRIPTION OF SECURITY CONTROLS DOMAIN 
This appendix explains the different security controls domain as provided in the CSA 
cloud control matrix (CCM) [57]. The security controls domain helps to classify the se-
lected security controls. 
S/N Security control 
domain 
Security 
domain ID 
Description 
1 Application & In-
terface Security 
(Data Integrity)  
AIS-03 Data input and output integrity routines (i.e., reconciliation 
and edit checks) shall be implemented for application inter-
faces and databases to prevent manual or systematic pro-
cessing errors, corruption of data, or misuse. 
2 Application & In-
terface Security 
(Data Security/In-
tegrity) 
AIS-04 Policies and procedures shall be established and maintained 
in support of data security to include (confidentiality, integ-
rity, and availability) across multiple system interfaces, juris-
dictions, and business functions to prevent improper disclo-
sure, alteration, or destruction. 
3 Encryption & Key 
Management 
(Sensitive Data 
Protection) 
EKM-03 Policies and procedures shall be established, and supporting 
business processes and technical measures implemented, for 
the use of encryption protocols for protection of sensitive data 
in storage (e.g., file servers, databases, and end-user work-
stations), data in use (memory), and data in transmission (e.g., 
system interfaces, over public networks, and electronic mes-
saging) as per applicable legal, statutory, and regulatory com-
pliance obligations. 
4 Encryption & Key 
Management 
(Storage and Ac-
cess) 
EKM-04 Platform and data-appropriate encryption (e.g., AES-256) in 
open/validated formats and standard algorithms shall be re-
quired. Keys shall not be stored in the cloud (i.e., at the cloud 
provider in question), but maintained by the cloud consumer 
or trusted key management provider. Key management and 
key usage shall be separated duties. 
5 Identity & Access 
Management (Au-
dit Tools Access) 
IAM-01 Access to, and use of, audit tools that interact with the organ-
ization's information systems shall be appropriately segre-
gated and access restricted to prevent inappropriate disclosure 
and tampering of log data. 
6 Identity & Access 
Management 
(Segregation of 
Duties) 
IAM-05 User access policies and procedures shall be established, and 
supporting business processes and technical measures imple-
mented, for restricting user access as per defined segregation 
of duties to address business risks associated with a user-role 
conflict of interest. 
7 Identity & Access 
Management 
(User Access Au-
thorization) 
IAM-09 Provisioning user access (e.g., employees, contractors, cus-
tomers (tenants), business partners, and/or supplier relation-
ships) to data and organizationally-owned or managed (phys-
ical and virtual) applications, infrastructure systems, and net-
work components shall be authorized by the organization's 
management prior to access being granted and appropriately 
restricted as per established policies and procedures. Upon re-
quest, provider shall inform customer (tenant) of this user ac-
cess, especially if customer (tenant) data is used as part the 
service and/or customer (tenant) has some shared responsibil-
ity over implementation of control. 
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8 Identity & Access 
Management 
(User ID Creden-
tials) 
IAM-12 Internal corporate or customer (tenant) user account creden-
tials shall be restricted as per the following, ensuring appro-
priate identity, entitlement, and access management and in ac-
cordance with established policies and procedures: 
 • Identity trust verification and service-to-service application 
(API) and information processing interoperability (e.g., SSO 
and Federation) 
 • Account credential lifecycle management from instantia-
tion through revocation 
 • Account credential and/or identity store minimization or re-
use when feasible 
 • Adherence to industry acceptable and/or regulatory compli-
ant authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) rules 
(e.g., strong/multi-factor, expireable, non-shared authentica-
tion secrets) 
9 Infrastructure & 
Virtualization Se-
curity Network 
Architecture 
IVS-13 Network architecture diagrams shall clearly identify high-risk 
environments and data flows that may have legal compliance 
impacts. Technical measures shall be implemented and shall 
apply defense-in-depth techniques (e.g., deep packet analysis, 
traffic throttling, and black-holing) for detection and timely 
response to network-based attacks associated with anomalous 
ingress or egress traffic patterns (e.g., MAC spoofing and 
ARP poisoning attacks) and/or distributed denial-of-service 
(DDoS) attacks. 
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APPENDIX D: DESCRIPTION OF SELECTED SECURITY CON-
TROLS 
This appendix describes the different security controls selected to mitigate the identified 
threats in the TSM application. The security controls descriptions are as provided by 
NIST [56] in the NVD database. 
S/N Security 
Control 
Family 
Security 
Control 
ID 
Security Con-
trol Name 
Security Control Description 
1 Access Con-
trol 
AC-2 Account Man-
agement 
See https://nvd.nist.gov/800-53/Rev4/con-
trol/AC-2 
AC-3  Access Enforce-
ment 
The information system enforces approved au-
thorizations for logical access to information 
and system resources in accordance with appli-
cable control policies 
AC-5 Separation of 
Duties 
See https://nvd.nist.gov/800-53/Rev4/con-
trol/AC-5 
AC-6 Least Privilege The organization employs the principle of least 
privilege, allowing only authorized accesses 
for users (or processes acting on behalf of us-
ers) which are necessary to accomplish as-
signed tasks in accordance with organizational 
missions and business functions 
2 Contingency 
Planning 
CP-9(6) Information 
System Backup | 
Redundant Sec-
ondary System 
The organization accomplishes information 
system backup by maintaining a redundant sec-
ondary system that is not collocated with the 
primary system and that can be activated with-
out loss of information or disruption to opera-
tions 
3 Identification 
and Authenti-
cation 
IA-2(13) Identification 
and Authentica-
tion (Organiza-
tional users) | 
Out-of-band au-
thentication 
The information system implements a defined 
out-of-band authentication under organization-
defined conditions 
IA-5 Authenticator 
Management 
See https://nvd.nist.gov/800-53/Rev4/con-
trol/IA-5 
4 System and 
Services Ac-
quisition 
SA-13 Trustworthiness See https://nvd.nist.gov/800-53/Rev4/con-
trol/SA-13  
SA-18 Tamper Re-
sistance and De-
tection 
The organization implements a tamper protec-
tion program for the information system, sys-
tem component, or information system service 
5 System and 
Communica-
tions Protec-
tion 
SC-5 Denial of Ser-
vice Protection 
The information system protects against or lim-
its the effects of several types of denial of ser-
vice attacks by employing organization-de-
fined safeguards 
SC-5(3) Denial of Ser-
vice Protection | 
See https://nvd.nist.gov/800-53/Rev4/con-
trol/SC-5 
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Detection/Moni-
toring 
SC-8 Transmission 
Confidentiality 
and Integrity 
The information system protects the confiden-
tiality and integrity of transmitted information 
SC-8(1) Transmission 
Confidentiality 
and Integrity | 
Cryptographic 
or Alternate 
Physical Protec-
tion 
The information system implements crypto-
graphic mechanism to prevent unauthorized 
disclosure of information, detect changes to in-
formation during transmission unless other-
wise protected by organization-defined alterna-
tive physical safeguards 
SC-12 Cryptographic 
Key Establish-
ment and Man-
agement 
The organization establishes and manages 
cryptographic keys for required cryptography 
employed within the information system in ac-
cordance with organization-defined require-
ments for key generation, distribution, storage, 
access and destruction 
SC-13 Cryptographic 
Protection 
The organization system implements organiza-
tion-defined cryptographic uses and types of 
cryptography required for each use in accord-
ance with applicable federal laws, executive or-
ders, directives, policies, regulations, and 
standards 
SC-16 Transmission of 
Security Attrib-
utes 
The information system associates organiza-
tion-defined security attributes with infor-
mation exchanged between information sys-
tems and between system components 
SC-23 Session Authen-
ticity 
The information system protects the authentic-
ity of communications sessions 
6 System and 
Information 
Integrity 
SI-10 Information In-
put validation 
The information system checks the validity of 
organization-defined information inputs 
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APPENDIX E: A SNIPPET OF THE TSM APPLICATION ONTOL-
OGY 
This appendix presents a snippet of the TSM application ontology. 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<rdf:RDF 
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
    xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
    xmlns:to="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontology3125.owl#" 
    xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" 
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#"> 
  <owl:Ontology rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl"/> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontology3125.owl#Se-
curity_Controls_Domain"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:re-
source="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#Thing"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#TSMe_probe"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Sec_Monitoring_Probe"/> 
    </rdfs:subClassOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontology3125.owl#Se-
curity_Metrics"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:re-
source="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#Thing"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Spoofing"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Threat"/> 
    </rdfs:subClassOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Risk_Level"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:re-
source="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#Thing"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#CSP"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:re-
source="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#Thing"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#confidentiality"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Security_Objectives"/> 
    </rdfs:subClassOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Threshold"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:re-
source="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#Thing"/> 
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  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontology3125.owl#Ac-
cess_control"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Security_Control"/> 
    </rdfs:subClassOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#MJP_probe"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Sec_Monitoring_Probe"/> 
    </rdfs:subClassOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Hardware_Requirement"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:re-
source="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#Thing"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#DB_probe"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Sec_Monitoring_Probe"/> 
    </rdfs:subClassOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontology3125.owl#El-
evation_of_Privileges"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Threat"/> 
    </rdfs:subClassOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Tampering"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Threat"/> 
    </rdfs:subClassOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Storage_asset"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Asset"/> 
    </rdfs:subClassOf> 
  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontology3125.owl#In-
frastructure_and_virtualization_security"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Security_Controls_Domain"/> 
  </owl:Class> 
  <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#CEC_probe"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf> 
      <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.ontologies.com/Ontol-
ogy3125.owl#Sec_Monitoring_Probe"/> 
    </rdfs:subClassOf> 
 
